Somalia: The Structural Weakness of the Provisional Government

Last Updated: Dec 29, 2012 - 11:50:28 AM ANALYSIS 29 Dec 29, 2012 - 11:42:33 AM By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein Closed-source intelligence provides the basis for explaining the lack of progress that “Somalia’s” new provisional federal government (p.f.g.) has thusfar made in establishing effective governance. A source from Mogadishu reports on the relations between the Western “donor”-powers/United Nations/AMISOM and the p.f.g.; and a source from the West reports on the relations within the p.f.g. and between the p.f.g. and other Somali political factions. Taken together, the sources describe the weakness of the p.f.g. that is responsible for the government’s ineffectiveness. The analysis that can be derived from the intelligence centers on a fundamental problem of power distribution faced by the p.f.g. that renders it incapable of effective action; that is, lack of progress by the p.f.g. is not due to defects in leadership, but to its position in a configuration of power that defines the conjuncture of actors with interests in Somalia. The following discussion will begin with the analysis and then employ the intelligence to illustrate it. The p.f.g. Pulled Apart The great mistake of many Somali intellectuals and activists, when they criticize the p.f.g., and argue that its president, Hassan sh. Mohamoud, is incompetent, non-inclusive, or power-hungry, is to isolate the p.f.g., taking it out of its context in a power configuration. Any or all of the accusations against Hassan might or might not be true, but they might not have a decisive impact on the p.f.g.’s (in)effectiveness, if the p.f.g. has already been rendered ineffective by other more important factors. The p.f.g. is a weak actor in a power configuration in which it is pulled by the proxy-chain presided over by the “donor”-powers, which hold the purse strings and bankroll AMISOM, and pulled into the fragmented clan, local, and regional conflicts of Somali politics. A government that cannot support itself and cannot exert control over the territory that it is supposed to govern can be called a “permanent” government for the purposes of international convenience, but it is sovereign only in a restricted legal sense and not I actuality. How can a government provide security and deliver services if it depends on external actors to finance it and those actors are not giving it the resources to perform its basic functions? How can a government govern if its authority is actively disputed within its supposed territory and the very form of its political system has not been determined? The p.f.g. is financially starved from without and contested from within. What can it be expected to do? Political outcomes in “Somalia” are not under the p.f.g.’s control, but are resultants of the play between external actors, the p.f.g., and domestic factions. Critics of Hassan and the p.f.g. should ask themselves if any leader could be effective in such a power distribution. It is the easiest thing to blame leadership as a deflection from the unwillingness or inability to address more serious and less tractable structural conditions, which is not, of course, to say that Hassan is a strong leader. The p.f.g. is like Gulliver in Jonathon Swift’s novel, confronting both Brobdingnagian giants and Lilliputian dwarfs – and both are equally destructive. The Pull from Without The intelligence from Mogadishu provides an inside look at the tensions and struggles between the “donor”-powers/UN and the p.f.g. The source reports on a meeting in Mogadishu between the “donor”-powers/UN and the p.f.g. over control of the funds that the “donor”-powers are preparing to give to the p.f.g. The meeting ended without resolution because the p.f.g. demanded that it control the aid, and the “donor”-powers said that the aid would not be forthcoming unless the p.f.g. availed itself of “donor”-power “expertise.” The U.N.’s deputy special representative, Peter de Clercq, is reported to have said that the p.f.g. could not work “side by side” with the “donor”-powers and would need outside “expertise” for the next twenty years. According to the source, the “donor”-powers’ position has led to outside N.G.O.s flooding into and setting up shop in Mogadishu with the aim of getting contracts for projects covering the normal functioning of government. Meanwhile, the p.f.g. has been financially starved, a condition that will persist at least until the tug of war between the “donor”-powers and p.f.g. ends; and probably beyond then. The source reports that parliamentary speaker, Mohamed sh. Osman Jawari, has complained that money has not been provided to pay the salaries of members of parliament. The speaker has stated the problem succinctly: “We can’t do anything without money.” Expressing his frustration, Jawari wonders how it will be possible for the p.f.g. to “compromise” with the “donor”-powers. The source adds that Somalia’s central bank is unable to function effectively because it does not have the $110,000.00 to pay for essential software and does not even have machines for identifying counterfeit money or even for counting bills. The tensions between the “donor”-powers and the p.f.g. came out in the open on December 23 when p.f.g. minister for social affairs, Maryan Qasim Aweys, held a press conference, reported by Garoweonline, at which she said: “The Somali Federal Government wants to see new changes and expects all international agencies to present their plans and consult with the Somali Federal Government prior to aid operations in the country.” Henceforth, said the minister, aid agencies would operate under the oversight of the p.f.g. and would be required to “match the expectations designed by the Somali Federal Government.” Given the source’s assessment, it is not likely that the p.f.g.’s demands will be met by the “donor”-powers/UN. Minister Qasim’s statement is part of the tug of war and shows that the struggle is getting out of hand. The p.f.g. is attempting to resist the pull from the “donor”-powers to make it a trusteeship entity. Aside from any other interests that the “donor”-powers have, they do not trust the p.f.g. with their money because they do not consider it to be competent and resistant to corruption. Similar tensions hobbled preceding Somali transitional administrations; nothing has changed for the new “permanent”/provisional government. The Pull From Within As the p.f.g. attempts to secure funds and some control over their use, the Western source reports that “local issues are keeping the president busy.” In particular, according to the source, the administration of the south (Gedo and the Jubba regions) is viewed as a “life and death” issue by Hassan. The p.f.g. has taken the position that any administration for the southern regions should be approved by the p.f.g., whereas the factions in the south that are participating in the process of forming a “Jubbaland” state, under the aegis of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.), insist on setting up the administration themselves. Contonued