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In lieu of our annual review of the year’s past happenings, we share with our readers the following report card. Comprised of two interrelated evaluations, one for the President and the other for the sitting Prime Minister is a high level review of the problems and prospects associated with these two leaders.
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In the case of the PM, we would expect our readers to take this report card as a probationary evaluation due to his short term in office, and look critically at what he has done so far, what he could have done, or what opportunities afforded to him that he missed. On the other hand, we would give the president a final judgmental evaluation as to what we think regarding his open record during his tenure.
President Sharif Ahmed’s Report Card
When Shaikh Sheriff Ahmed was elected the president of the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) in Jan 2009, in Djibouti, his first political impact was immediately felt in the very creation of a bloated transitional parliament. The 250 body, established and agreed-upon at the Embagathi reconciliation conference, had to be increased to 550 mainly to accommodate his political demand at the time. The international community and Somalis as well gave him a healthy dose of confidence because he was perceived to be someone who would rally the nation and unify the newly-expanded parliament.
With the expectation that his involvement with the Islamic Union Courts (ICU) would lead to reconciliation with radical Islamists, including the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabab group, Shaikh Sharif got what he wanted. Today, the outsized and ineffective parliament represents one of Somalia’s intractable issues. We attribute this problem to the coming of Sheikh Sharif into the political scene.
Mr. Sharif proved to be an ineffective individual who utilized his newly-acquired political capital for personal dealings, allegedly engaging in corruption, and pushing nepotism to a new height while ignoring Al Shabab’s open presence in the capital and throughout the troubled regions in South and Central Somalia. As a result almost three years into his administration, South-Central Somalia remains to be the only unstable region that is impeding the process of pacification in the country.
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) in Jan 2009, in Djibouti, his first political impact was immediately felt in the very creation of a bloated transitional parliament. The 250 body, established and agreed-upon at the Embagathi reconciliation conference, had to be increased to 550 mainly to accommodate his political demand at the time. The international community and Somalis as well gave him a healthy dose of confidence because he was perceived to be someone who would rally the nation and unify the newly-expanded parliament.
With the expectation that his involvement with the Islamic Union Courts (ICU) would lead to reconciliation with radical Islamists, including the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabab group, Shaikh Sharif got what he wanted. Today, the outsized and ineffective parliament represents one of Somalia’s intractable issues. We attribute this problem to the coming of Sheikh Sharif into the political scene.
Mr. Sharif proved to be an ineffective individual who utilized his newly-acquired political capital for personal dealings, allegedly engaging in corruption, and pushing nepotism to a new height while ignoring Al Shabab’s open presence in the capital and throughout the troubled regions in South and Central Somalia. As a result almost three years into his administration, South-Central Somalia remains to be the only unstable region that is impeding the process of pacification in the country.
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