The
opinion piece of renowned Somali born novelist, professor Nuruddin Farah,
published on the opinion pages of October 14 New York Times, under the title Somalia's
Leader: Look Past the Hype, recycles the bashing lines that few Somali politicians
fallen from grace with the people of Somalia have been throwing at president
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for quite some time for self-serving aims. The piece trumps
up political allegations while it dismisses the truths and contexts. Surprisingly,
the professor, contrary to what expected from an enlightened person like him, has
lowered himself by owing and circulating hearsay stories he doubts their
truthfulness.
Sadly,
by stating that “President Mohamud didn’t
have the determination to lead the country, nor the hardiness to stand up to
clan elders who have contributed to the two decade civil war and still dominate
the country,”, which seems overboard assertion, the professor nurtures the
bad culture he warned against, which is “Somalis
are notorious for their petty mindedness, tendency to focus on their grievances
and constant warring.” The sum of the implicitly singled out clan elders
and their followers, the great number of political panhandlers and their peers,
the terrorist and piracy groups and their associates, and the pervasive culture
of petty mindedness will leave Somalia with no good people.
While
the government has the responsibility to explain the case of the killer of the staff
members of Doctors Without Borders released by appellate judges, all other allegations
crammed in the piece are personal attacks to defeat good policies beneficial for
all Somalis. The allegations include the claim of loss of credibility among the Troop Contributing Countries
of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)-probably intended for Kenya, the disputed
Central Bank fleecing, professor Ahmed Ismail Samater’s frivolous complain of
losing the presidential election for vote buying, and Dr. Ali Khalif Galleyr’s preposterous
allegation that unnamed British and American intelligence sources linked president
Hassan to Al Shabab- a terrorist group bent to destroy any Somali government- and
finally the demand for the prosecution of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys for
terrorism in difference to his allies now hailed as heroes. In conclusion,
Professor Nuruddin appeals to the West to end its darling of President Hassan, and
particularly to the Time Magazine to re-evaluate its claim that president Hassan
as one of the 100 most influential people in the world.
First,
as background, in 2006, upon the request of undisclosed but maybe now
identifiable member of the defunct Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Professor
Nuruddin had extensive discussions with Sheikh Hassan Aweys and other leaders during
his failed mediation mission between the ICU and the former Transitional
Federal Government of President Abdullahi Yusuf. In the opinion piece titled My
Life as Diplomat published in the New York Times on May 26, 2007, the
professor didn’t hide his distaste towards Sheikh Hassan Aweys.
Second,
according to Professor Ahmed I. Samater’s admission, the abysmal failure of his
presidential ambition was not principally due to money but to many other
factors including strong doubt about his leadership as a Somali politician and
the genuineness of his slogans, later confirmed by his sudden political
conversion. Third, the pitiful leadership performances of former Prime
Ministers were sufficient to take their allegations with grain of salt.
Among
the 2012 presidential candidates, President Hassan was one of the most qualified
presidential candidates in terms of character, education, good understanding of
domestic problems and international geopolitics. He pledged to focus on establishing
the foundations of the Somali State,
neglected by the preceding transitional governments. That doesn’t mean that
president Hassan’s leadership is without major political mistakes but the
allegations in the piece are idle talk (fadhi ku dirir) stories.
The
major source of the on-going political tension in Somalia is due to the clash
between the clan rivalries fueled by yet to be defined federal system and the
urgent need for a national integration under the rule of law for ending state
fragility. The performance of the Somali government depends on many factors,
including nationalistic leadership, the overcoming of the civil war bitterness
and Somali elite egocentricity, and check on foreign interventions.
After
more than two decades of statelessness for civil war and foreign manipulations,
the first permanent national representative government, which controls only a
fraction of the country, has exceptionally received diplomatic recognition from
key international powers. Unfortunately, some have seen this international
special treatment as a personal gift to President Hassan rather than seeing
it as an opportunity for the Somali
people to collectively own their country and destiny by fostering internal
unity despite many differences.
The
leaders of the new government pledged to restore and protect the sovereignty,
dignity, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Somalia on
the basis of not on clan fiefdoms and preferences, but on national strategy
founded on decentralized regional administrations connected and loyal to a democratic
accountable central authority and not to foreign powers. The stay in state
fragility, defined as a country where the government lacks the ability to
perform the functions necessary for the security and well-being of the
population languishing in poverty, insecurity and hopelessness, is immoral and
unacceptable.
Neighboring
countries (Kenya and Ethiopia) have diplomatic relations with Somalia but they deliberately
ignore the respect of the principles of
equality of states and no-interference, and
are determined to vandalize the gained international diplomatic recognition. As
reported by Ethiopian Government’s News
bulletin of October 23, Ethiopia establishes a strategic relationship
with Somaliland and is proud of the role it played in the endorsement of the
Somaliland Special Arrangement (SSA) in Brussels with the support of UK and
Danish governments. In addition, Ethiopia leads the process of alienating the
people in the Jubba regions. These blatant interferences are one of the major
challenges facing the Somali government because it fuels internal political
instability and loss of legitimacy. The expert witnesses at US Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations' hearing on the Security and Governance in Somalia, held on
October 8, unanimously stressed that the US government should rein in the
aggressive intervention of Kenya and Ethiopia in the internal affairs of
Somalia to ensure peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.
During
the last eight years, the international community spent billions of dollars in
the name of Somalia, but the new Government did not inherit: (a) a constitution
which ends the country’s fragmentation into clan enclaves; (b) basic public
administration structure; (c) an established security forces; (d) credible public
record; and (e) national revenue sources except Mogadishu port revenues. Most
of the country remained beyond the control of the central government’s legal
authority. Nevertheless, some unscrupulous political opponents demand the fulfillment
of functions and services beyond the federal government’s capacity for lack of
national integration and resources as well as for lack of direct support from
the international community. The politically motivated accusations targeted
against the president tap the myriads of problems and challenges either left
unresolved at their right forums or purposely created by foreign powers to
undermine Somalia’s march towards statehood like Jubbaland crisis.
Since
the constitution making process of eight years did not resolve the fragmented political
power of the country, the role of the federal government remains to support and
legitimize the peacemaking efforts of AMISOM forces under the United Nations
Security Council Resolutions and embrace foreign dictated agenda. However, on September
16, the international community endorsed, in the context of the international
engagement with fragile states, a New Deal
for Somalia with the pledge of 2.5 billion dollars for 2014-2016. The New
Deal is not without dangerous traps.
In
general, the goal seems to be to re-establish within three years throughout
Somalia the foundations of a Somali State based on the rule of law rather than
on clan parochialism. The essential condition for achieving this goal is the
unequivocal respect of the federal government’s leadership and immediate
fulfillments of the New Deal pledges.
Moreover, the Somali people- government, politicians, religious and community
leaders, and elite class- have to set aside the insistence on fractured
governance structures and to seize the new opportunity for an integrated system
of governance for real peaceful transformation and exit from the fragile situation.
The alternative would be a continued polarization and brinkmanship that will
hasten the already in progress demise of Somalia, which in turn, will increase regional
insecurity.
Mr. Mohamud M.
Uluso
mohamuduluso@gmail.com
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