Introduction: This situation report continues the research project on regional politics and security in the Horn of Africa conducted by the Institute for Security Studies. While it follows in the footsteps of a 2008 situation report that was concerned primarily with the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea,2 the current report is more concerned with the prevailing internal political situation in Djibouti and the conduct of the country’s April 2011 presidential elections. The first part provides a brief overview of the political and electoral history of Djibouti. The second gives the legal framework for the conduct of elections and then examines the preparations for the April 2011 presidential elections and the results.It also surveys the most salient features of Djibouti’s party system, focusing principally on the alignment of existing political parties. Part three considers the build-up to the April 2011 presidential elections, including constitutional amendments, the mysterious deaths of some senior officials, the exaggeration of the role played by Abdurahman Boreh, and the sudden outbreak of public protests. The fourth part describes the mainly military involvement of Eritrea, the United States (US) and France in Djibouti.
The principal sources of data used in the report are books, journal articles, unpublished reports and media publications. In order to strengthen aspects of the limited data that was available the author has used data collected during his many visits to Djibouti between 2008 and 2010.4 During these visits, he interacted with and interviewed many individuals who provided background and specific information in a credible manner.
In 1862, Obock – the northern part of present-day Djibouti – was ceded to France. This led eventually to the establishment in 1890 of a larger French colony.5 In effect – through a series of treaties concluded with local sultans in 1885 and with Ethiopia in 1897 – France peacefully formalised its control over the colony. It came to be known as French Somaliland and then as the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas.6 France administered the colony without much change until 1946 when some degree of autonomy was granted with the election of representatives to the French Parliament and the local assembly.7 Then, in 1967, France organised a referendum in the colony, in which 60 per cent of the electorate voted to remain
part of France.
part of France.
From 1967 to 1975, France favoured the Afars over the Issas, with most government posts going to the former region. Indeed, in 1968, the Afar Democratic Regroupement (RDA) won 26 of the 32 seats in the local assembly and the RDA’s pro-French and highly contested leader, Ali Aref, remained head of the local government. In 1975, following greater Issa agitation and interference from Ethiopia and Somalia, France decided to speed up the independence of the colony. In the process France ended its support of Aref in favour of Hasan Gouled Aptidon, the Issa leader of the African People’s League for Independence (LPAI). A referendum was held in 1977 and, out of a total of 81 000 votes, 98 per cent voted for independence from France.10 In 1981 Djibouti was de jure established as a single party state. The People’s Rally for Progress (RPP), which had replaced the LPAI in 1979, was declared the only legal party allowed to nominate candidates for elections. Aptidon comfortably won the 1982 presidential elections with 84 per cent of the vote and increased this to 89 per cent in 1987.
Aptidon managed to maintain Djibouti’s stability until 1991 when a civil war broke out. In August 1991, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) was established and in November of that year, it launched an armed insurgency in the northern part of Djibouti. The FRUD did so because of the political alienation and inequality that politically mobilised Afars felt they were experiencing and also because of the government’s rejection of genuine democratic power-sharing.
In July 1993, the gradually reinforced Djiboutian National Army launched an offensive and was able to put down the insurgency, leaving more than a thousand people dead. The Djiboutian government had enjoyed the support of Ethiopia and Eritrea, despite the fact that both countries have large Afar populations within their borders. The governments of these neighbouring states had been ‘surprised by initial successes of [the] FRUD and panicked at the prospect of a reversal in the balance of power in Djibouti’. The Djiboutian government signed peace agreements with the FRUD in both 1994 and 2001. These two agreements were made within the context of political reforms.
Indeed, in September 1992 at the height of the civil war, a new constitution was approved by a referendum. The country moved to a multi-party system, with four political parties allowed to register. The following year the People’s Rally for Progress under Aptidon won the election with 73 per cent of the vote in a 60 per cent turnout. When legislative elections were held in 1997, the RPP, which had by this time formed an electoral alliance with the FRUD, prevailed again. Two years later in 1999, RPP member Ismail Omar Guelleh (sometimes referred to as ‘IOG’), succeeded in replacing Aptidon both as president of the country and as president of the RPP.19 Guelleh won the April 1999 presidential elections with 74 per cent of the vote as the candidate of the RPP, which had joined forces with a faction of the FRUD to form a new ruling coalition – the Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP). In September 2002, the constitutional limit on the number of political parties was lifted, making way for the introduction of a full multi-party system or mulipartisme complet.
Nonetheless, in the elections held in January 2003, the UMP coalition won all 65 seats in the National Assembly, Djibouti’s unicameral Parliament.20 To contest these elections four opposition political parties had formed the Union for a Democratic Alternative (UAD). While the UAD had secured 38 per cent of the vote, this did not translate into any seats under Djibouti’s first-past-the-post electoral system. Presidential elections were again held in April 2005 and Guelleh stood unopposed as the UMP candidate and claimed 96,85 per cent of the votes on a 78,9 per cent turn out. The opposition UAD, which had failed to field a candidate, called for a boycott of the elections and disputed the high turnout figure. Parliamentary elections were held in January 2008 and the UMP again won all 65 seats.
Djibouti’s electoral arrangement
While the legal framework for Djibouti’s electoral process is governed by the Constitution of 1992, the Electoral Law of 1992 and its various amendments give further direction. The Constitution provides that the president shall be elected to a six-year term through universal suffrage and is limited to two terms (Article 23). If a candidate does not secure a majority of the votes cast in the first round, there The 2011 presidential elections is a provision for a second round between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes (Article 27).
The 1992 Electoral Law (Loi Organique n°1/AN/92) assigned the task of organising elections to an Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) constitute prior to elections. Decree n°2002-0198/PR/MI, related to the amendment on the composition and functioning of the CENI, provided that the electoral commission’s members should be representatives of government institutions (including members of the National Assembly), civil society, and political parties; and that they should be appointed on the basis of professional competence, integrity and patriotism (Articles 2, 3 and 7). According to Decree n°2005-0024/PR/MI of 2005, the CENI must be established 45 days before the elections and dissolved days thereafter (Articles 13 and 24).
The CENI is tasked with the overall responsibility of developing the voters’ roll, voter identity cards and polling day procedures. A lawyer by the name of Assoweh Idriss was elected in February 2011 as the head of the CENI, which has around 156 members. On the same day, six other members of the commission were appointed.23 The 1992 Electoral Law (Loi Organique n°1/AN/92) organised Djiboutian territory into five electoral constituencies. These consisted of Ali- Sabieh (6 seats), Dikhil (12 seats), Tadjourah (6 seats) and Obock (4 seats), with each of these constituencies correlating with the delimitation of a district (Article 16), plus Djibouti City (37 seats). Decree n°2005-0024/PR/MI of 2005, which is related to the composition and functioning of the Independent Regional Electoral Commission, added the Arta district (3 seats) as the sixth electoral constituency (Article 4).
In 2004, there were a total of around 275 polling stations across the country: this included 142 in Djibouti City, 36 in Dikhil, 19 in Ali-Sabieh, in Tadjourah and 16 in Obock. Moreover, the 2003 parliamentary elections cost 180 million Djibouti francs, which is about US$1 million. Half of this amount was financed by a grant from the US.25 There were approximately 208 000 registered voters for the 2005 presidential elections and 151 000 registered voters for the 2008 parliamentary elections.
Preparations for the April 2011 elections
Democracy International, which is a US-based firm providing consultancy services on democracy and governance, supervised an eight-man programme known as the Djibouti Elections and Political Process. This programme was under contract to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) under the Governing Justly and Democratically Assistance Agreement between the US and the Government of Djibouti. Primarily the programme aimed to strengthen the CENI’s management of the electoral process, carry out civic and voter education activities, enhance open political dialogue between the election administration and political parties, and provide international election observation.
Democracy International was ‘halfway through a two-year, US$2,2 million government-funded contract when it was accused of assisting opposition politicians’. Indeed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti sent a diplomatic note to the US Embassy dated 2 March [2011] requesting the end of the partnership with Democracy International, alleging it had participated in and supported a violent 18 February 2011 opposition rally. In January 2011, Democracy International urged the Djibouti government to launch a comprehensive information campaign airing voter education messages on democratic principles, the meaning of elections and the roles and responsibilities of citizens.
Furthermore, education addressing gaps in the public’s knowledge of important areas such as voter registration and the issuance of national identification cards would go far in increasing understanding and encouraging broader public participation in electoral processes. By way of complementing the informational efforts of the state and of encouraging greater popular participation in the elections, civil society organisations should seek ways to undertake non-partisan civic and voter education campaigns directed at traditionally marginalised groups such as women, the disabled, rural and semi-nomadic populations. Political parties In Djibouti, political parties can be broadly classified into two types: Those contained in the ruling coalition and those in the opposition coalition.
The ruling coalition is the UMP (Union for a Presidential Majority), which since 2008 has been headed by Dileita Mohammed Dileita, an Afar who served as Djibouti’s ambassador to Ethiopia and was appointed prime minister in 2001. The coalition is dominated by the RPP, the ruling party, which has won all elections since attaining political power in 1977 and provides much of the coalition’s leadership. As stated earlier the president of the RPP is Guelleh, while its secretary general is Idriss Arnaoud Ali, who is the current speaker of the National Assembly. The ruling coalition also contains elements of the following groups:
FRUD (the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy) led by Ali Mohammed Daoud; the Popular and Social Democratic Party (PSD) led by Omar Ahmed Youssouf (known as Omar Vincent) following the death of the party’s founder, Ahmed Boulaleh Barreh; and the Union of the Partisans of Reform (UPR), founded in 2005 and led by Ibrahim Chehem Daoud, who is a former member of the FRUD.
The ruling coalition is advantaged by unfettered access to the national media, which according to J Brass ‘cannot serve as a forum … because it is state-controlled and tightly monitored’.32 The UMP makes use of the state resources at its disposal for party financing. In fact, the most persistent problem in post-1991 Djiboutian politics is the fusion of the ruling party and the state and the ensuing difficulty of distinguishing between these two entities. This synchronisation is best reflected by the fact that high positions in the party apparatus are often synonymous with equivalent positions in the state apparatus. In this way the coalition implants a network of its members in virtually all government institutions at all levels, thus enabling it to maintain tight control over the day-to-day direction of decisionmaking.
The opposition coalition is the Union for a Democratic Alternative (UAD), which is headed by Ismail Guedi Hared, who led the cabinet (directeur de cabinet) of former president Aptidon from 1977 to 1999. The UAD has boycotted four elections since 2005, including the 2005 presidential elections, the 2006 regional elections, the 2008 parliamentary elections and the April 2011 presidential elections. Within this coalition is the Republican Alliance for Democracy (ARD), which was established in 2002. The ARD was headed by Ahmed Dini Ahmed until his death in 2004 and is currently led by Ahmed Youssouf Houmed, who formerly held a ministerial position. Also in the coalition are the Movement for Democratic Renewal (MRD) headed by Daher Ali Farah, who edited a government newspaper, and the Union for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) headed by Hared, who is shy and reserved and lacks the guile and charisma of Dini.36 Also aligned with the UAD is the Union of Democratic Movements (UMD), headed by Aden Robleh Awaleh.
The opposition political parties have failed in many respects to gain equitable and proportional access to political power and been unable to mount a strongand effective challenge to the ruling coalition. They have been disadvantaged by the first-past-the-post electoral system and also by ‘the government’s dominance of the media, its routine intimidation of the opposition’s supporters and its severe restrictions on the freedom of speech, association and assembly’. They accordingly lack confidence in a political system which has historically marginalised them. Moreover, the opposition parties are very weak in terms of organisational and financial capacity, number of members and material resources. They are paralysed by defections and division into rival factions, leaving most of the strong cards in Guelleh’s hands.
The opposition political parties have failed to draw broad support. In fact, many Djiboutians say that these parties have failed to present appealing or substantive policies which they could support. One reason might be that the parties in the opposition coalition are deeply divided in their vision for Djibouti’s future. Another reason is the lack of a coherent political culture, with individual parties too weak to act independently. Furthermore, critics claim that opposition parties are based on clan and tribal identity. … Some explain the boycott of [elections] by pointing to the absence within the opposition parties of solid and charismatic leaders with enough vision to appeal to the wider Djiboutian public; the lack of concrete platforms and agendas defining their political position, thereby offering no real alternative to voters; and the inability of the opposition to organise itself administratively and politically. Critics also argue that, more specifically, Dini’s ‘death left a vacuum of leadership within the opposition coalition which is often criticised for its lack of direction and vision’. Indeed, the opposition clearly needs a leader untainted by ties to the Guelleh power structure.
The results
After some campaigning, including the ruling coalition’s public rallies and performances, which enjoyed a great deal of coverage in state-owned media, voting took place on 8 April 2011. It took place in a largely peaceful and orderly manner, with minimal security incidents despite fears following the antigovernment protests of February 2011. Opposition parties boycotted the elections partly due to their concerns about the CENI’s independence and neutrality. They had not put forward candidates by the 9 March 2011 deadline, leaving only two names on the ballot paper, that of Guelleh and Mohammed Warsama.43 Born in 1959, Warsama served as president of the Constitutional Court between 2005 and 2009.44 He ran as an independent candidate and had a limited support base.45 But, in the final stages of the campaign, he received the backing of Aden Robleh Awaleh, the head of the Union of Democratic Movements,46 and Mohammed Daoud Chehem, the head of the Djiboutian Party for Development (PDD).
According to preliminary results released by the Ministry of Interior, Guelleh obtained about 80,56 per cent of the vote, easily and expectedly47 defeating Warsama, who garnered the remaining 19,42 per cent.48 It is widely believed that Warsama only provided Guelleh ‘with a token rival for this contest in name only’49 and that the lack of a viable opposition candidate enabled Guelleh to be re-elected for a third term. The only unknown factor before the elections was the level of abstention, which had the potential to diminish voter turnout.50 However, in a bitter disappointment to opposition parties, the voter turnout from 152 000 registered voters was officially recorded at about 70 per cent.
For these presidential elections, there were 386 polling stations in Djibouti including 217 in Djibouti City, 46 in Dikhil, 32 in Ali-Sabieh and 19 in Arta. The elections were monitored by an African Union (AU) observer mission composed of 27 members and led by Jacques Baudin, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal. The mission concluded that the elections were organised in accordance with the regulations governing the conduct of elections in Djibouti. Removal of presidential term limits and suspect deaths Under the 1992 constitution, the president is to be elected for two terms of six years. Accordingly, Guelleh was re-elected in 2005 for his second and last term. However, in April 2010, the National Assembly pushed through constitutional amendments ‘which removed term limits, cut the presidential term to five years from six, created a senate and abolished capital punishment’.
Build-up to the 2011 elections
This development was followed by a possibly coincidental but nonetheless suspect spate of deaths. These included the May 2010 suicide of Colonel Abdi Hassan Bogoreh, who had been Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie since 2005, and a few months later in August 2010 the death of Lieutenant Colonel Abdillahi Mouhoumed, a top official in the Department of Documentation and Security. Lt Col Mouhoumed, who allegedly succumbed to a heart attack, was from an Issa subclan, the Saad Moussa.
The February 2011 protests
Relatively small incidents of public protest, although still in the thousands, were held on 5 and 6 February 2011. The demonstrations were said to have been triggered by some serious flaws in the marking of some law student examination papers [and] rapidly escalated into a general contesting of government policy when middle level and high school pupils joined in. The latter were frequently more determined that their elder siblings. They were also joined by young unemployed people. The unemployed protestors were from Balbala, which is Djibouti City’s largest slum.
More violent protests were held less than two weeks later on 18 and 19 February 2011. Independent observers estimated that the size of the 18 February demonstration was between one and two thousand people.55 The protesters, mainly dissatisfied youths, were seemingly inspired by incidents in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen.56 The protesters brandished banners which read ‘IOG get out’, ‘Ben Ali + Mubarak = IOG’ and ‘No to a third term’. They demanded that Guelleh step down immediately. In an unprecedented outburst of anger against Guelleh’s government, the protesters threw stones at the police and burnt several vehicles. The government used tear gas to try to break up the protests.
After two days of violent unrest that garnered international attention, the government arrested more than a hundred party activists and briefly detained three prominent opposition figures accusing them of organising the protests. The arrested leaders were Ismail Guedi Hared, Aden Robleh Awaleh and Mohammed Daoud Chehem. As mentioned, Chehem, a former member of the prime minister’s cabinet (directeur de cabinet), heads the Djiboutian Party for Development, which was expelled in 2004 from the UAD opposition coalition after Chehem unilaterally tried to contest the 2005 presidential elections. Chelem’s nephew is Ibrahim Chehem Daoud, who, as mentioned earlier, heads the UPR (Union of the Partisans of Reform).
With the clashes taking an alarming turn and apparently leading to two deaths, the government deployed police by the hundreds to patrol neighbourhoods58 and banned opposition meetings and demonstrations. The Boreh factor Abdurahman Boreh has all of a sudden emerged as Guelleh’s major opposition contender. Like Guelleh, he was born in Dire Dawa, eastern Ethiopia, and he is said to be privy to Guelleh’s internal dealings and networks. Boreh is believed to have been involved in most of the lucrative businesses and deal-making in Djibouti. He controlled the large-scale trade in rice, cigarettes and other foodstuffs and has invested in fisheries and construction. He is said to have been instrumental in bringing a Dubai-based company, Dubai Ports World, to invest heavily in Djibouti, including building the luxury Kempinski Hotel.61 Boreh was even rumoured to have had business dealings with Somalia’s warlords and business groups.
Guelleh and Boreh fell out and Boreh, who had seemed untouchable, was sacked from his position as head of the Autorité des Ports et des Zones Franches (Djibouti Port and Free Zone Authority) in June 2008. Lately, however, there have been persistent rumours in Djibouti that Boreh has made a number of visits to Eritrea and that he has met members of the Djiboutian opposition based in France. Meanwhile, in June 2010, a Djiboutian court sentenced Boreh to 15 years in prison in absentia and a fine of US$56 000.62 Despite this, Boreh, who at the time of writing was living in London, was said to have planned to contest the 2011 presidential elections.63 Also, he claims that his company’s properties were seized by the Djibouti government.
The Eritrean military threat
Since its independence in 1977, Djibouti has been trapped between neighbours who are hostile to each other. For decades it has experienced the antagonism between Ethiopia and Somalia and since 1998 between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The fact that after 1998 Djibouti became Ethiopia’s sole outlet to the sea has drawn it into the dangerous conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as evidenced in February 2008 by Eritrea’s incursion into supposedly Djiboutian territory.65 More seriously, in June 2008, fighting erupted between the military forces of Djibouti and Eritrea, with Eritrea seizing geo-strategic locations in northern Djibouti, including the Doumeira (Gabla Mountain) on the mainland and the islands of Doumeira and Kallida. In the resulting fighting at least nine Djiboutian soldiers were killed, with 50 wounded and a Djiboutian senior officer and 18 soldiers captured.
After these clashes, France established a temporary military base between the Djiboutian coastal city of Moulhoule and Khor Angar. This French base included a combat unit and a logistical team supposedly for further support of the weaker Djiboutian National Army,66 and it undertook the collection the bodies of soldiers killed during the fighting. During the June 2008 fighting, the French contingent conducted aerial reconnaissance and reportedly sent three ships, lending further credibility to France’s stated commitment to defend Djibouti. However, there had been no compelling evidence of any additional and more direct French military involvement.
Even in June 2008, Eritrea, which is struggling with internal dissent, was in no position to attack deep into Djibouti and could not risk defeat by the French military contingent. It had already been defeated by Ethiopia during their 1998– 2000 war. Another military defeat would be suicidal for Eritrea and the French presence seems to have served at least to psychologically counter any further incursion by Eritrea. Moreover, for Ethiopia, an Eritrean attack on Djibouti would mean that Eritrea had finally crossed the Rubicon and attacked its lifeline. In June 2010, following Qatar’s mediation efforts, Eritrean troops withdrew from the contested border areas.
A Qatari observation force was deployed to monitor the border area between the two countries until a final agreement could eventually be reached. A joint committee chaired by the Qatari prime minister was due to be formed and was tasked to appoint an international company to demarcate the common border between Eritrea and Djibouti, with the consent of the two countries. Qatar, which enjoys good relations with the two uneasy neighbours, is due to continue monitoring the border until the final and binding decision is announced by the joint committee on the settlement of the border dispute.
The agreement was welcomed by China, the AU and the United Nations (UN), but drew criticism from Ethiopia. Ethiopia is still wary of Eritrea’s intentions and is clearly concerned about Qatar’s influence in the Horn of Africa and its frequent, high-level contact with both the Eritrean and Djiboutian governments. Within Djibouti the effect of the Eritrea-Djibouti conflict has been to heighten internal ethnic tensions. Afar disenchantment with the Issa-dominated government remains widespread and has been expressed through an insurgency spearheaded by the FRUD.75 The situation is tense but has not deteriorated to the level of 1991 when the insurgency erupted over demands for autonomy, which slowly receded after the 1994 and 2001 peace agreements.
However, the situation has been exacerbated by the claim that Eritrea is recruiting, training and arming unemployed Afar youths and sending them into Djibouti to plant mines and launch attacks against the Djiboutian National Army. In External involvement light of current ethnic tension, Afar raids could conceivably be dangerous. As of the first quarter of 2011 the Djiboutian government remains genuinely worried that a potential Afar insurgency in the north could quickly spread to the south, especially in view of the fact that the Djiboutian National Army is weak and the population in Djibouti City is facing deteriorating economic conditions due to high unemployment and inflation, which surged to 3,8 per cent in 2010.
In fact, from media reports, the FRUD, which has been recruiting Afar youths, resisted an attack by the Djiboutian National Army in September 2009 on its position in the Mablas region. The troops were supposedly units based at Gal Ela in Mablas, together with reinforcements from the barracks at Tadjourah and Obock. If this FRUD report is accurate, then this military operation would have been the Djibouti National Army’s first major offensive against the FRUD since the one of May 2006.
US military presence
In 2002, the US established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTFHoA). It is based upon the assumption that transnational terrorist cells would flee the 2001 US-led campaign in Afghanistan, establish a safe haven in the Horn of Africa and proceed to coordinate future attacks from there. It is a multi-service formation operating under the auspices of the US African Command (AFRICOM), which since March 2010 has been led by Rear Admiral Brian Losey. Since 2003, the task force has been housed in Camp Lemonier, a former French Foreign Legion camp adjacent to the Djibouti-Ambouli international airport, which is managed by Dubai Ports World and has suitable runways and lighting conditions. The US pays around US$30 million annually for Camp Lemonier, which is its only official military base located in Africa.
The Camp Lemonier base is composed of approximately 2 000 short-term rotational personnel of whom the core staff is made up of between 320 and 375 reserve and active-duty officers. The personnel providing base support number between 250 and 284 for Camp Lemonier with an additional number of between 279 and 294 in the Provisional Security Company.80 The components of the thousand-strong manoeuvre include the Air Component Coordination Element, the Civil Affairs Teams, the Engineer Units and the Mil-to-Mil Training Teams. It encompasses military personnel, including all the major US services (Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines), intelligence personnel from the CIA82 and officers from allied countries. CJTF-HoA is responsible for the area covering Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Yemen. The other areas of interest include Uganda, Tanzania, Seychelles, Comoros, Mauritius and Madagascar.
The vast distances encompassed by the CJTF-HoA’s area of responsibility coupled with the shortage of roads make helicopters the primary means of long-distance travel and logistics supply for CJTF-HoA forces. Its troops train for counterterrorism missions in the Horn of Africa. From a military standpoint, CJTF-HoA is tasked to detect and destroy locations which are thought to be potential and actual hideouts for al-Qaeda elements, break their logistical lines and directly attack groups connected to al-Qaeda.84 It is also tasked to enhance the military capacity of the countries in its area of operation, with which it regularly exchanges information. CJTF-HoA conducts counter-terrorism training and joint operations focusing on tightening the security of porous borders, improving airport security and undertaking better maritime security, thus limiting the opportunity for terrorists to hide and organise.
French military presence France currently (as of April 2011) has around 2 900 soldiers in Djibouti, its largest base in Africa.87 For up to nine years, as of 2004, France pays an annual amount of €30 million to keep this force in place.88 The French military contingent has been commanded by Air Force Brigadier General Thierry Caspar-Fille-Lambie since August 2009 and is comprised of the 5th Regiment Interarmes d’Outre Mer (Overseas Joint Forces Regiment) and the 13th Demi-Brigade de la Legion Etrangère (Foreign Legion Half-brigade), with each regiment reduced to a core of 600 to 800 soldiers and equipped mainly with AMX-10RC light tanks, ERC-90 Sagaie reconnaissance vehicles, MILAN anti-tank missiles and 120 mm mortars.
On a 4-month rotational basis the two regiments are augmented with personnel from France. The regiments are supported by a carefully integrated apparatus of support units, including the 10th Bataillon de Commandement et de Service (Support and Command Battalion), which coordinates the logistical chain and the Détachement de l’Aviation Légère de l’Armée de Terre (DETALAT or Army Aviation Support Detachment) with five SA-330 Puma medium lift helicopters and two SA-342 Gazelle reconnaissance helicopters.
France also maintains an air force detachment in Djibouti – the Detachement Air 188 Colonel Emile Massart – which operates from the Djibouti-Ambouli international airport. This includes six Mirage 2000 C fighters and three Mirage 2000 D fighters of the Escadre de Chasse 3/11 Corse, plus one C-160 Transall transport aircraft, one AS-555 Fennec reconnaissance and anti-tank helicopter and two SA-330 Puma medium lift helicopters of the Escadron de Transport d’Outre Mer 00.088 Larzac. The aircraft are flown and serviced by 800 French Air Force personnel whose number is not likely to be cut. The air defence component includes three batteries of MISTRAL surface-to-air missiles.
The French military presence has acted as a deterrent against any would-be aggressor, and by extension has effectively eased the tensions in the Horn of Africa. France provides training to Djiboutian officers and special forces and air support for the Djiboutian National Army. This support also extends to troops on the ground, including intelligence, transportation, medical services and supply operations as during the clashes with Eritrea in June 2008. Moreover, in May 2009, the French conducted joint exercises with the Djiboutian National Army involving a thousand troops and focusing on counter-insurgency operations, including infiltration and ambushes.
The one-sided presidential elections held on 8 April 2011 will not have a significant impact on the distribution of power in Djibouti.90 The effect is simply to extend for a further five years Guelleh’s virtually unchallenged 12-year hold on power. In being far from fair and competitive, the outcome allows no prospect of a more pluralist political dynamic and will further aggravate the existing problems in Djiboutian politics.
Nevertheless, all political parties ought to play the democratic game of give-andtake. In the first place, opposition parties must act with a sense of responsibility by moderating political rhetoric. They should not fail to note their unpreparedness for power and the reality that they need more time to gather strength and experience. Opposition parties should learn how to function as an organised, united and especially, as a responsible force operating within the boundaries of the democratic process no matter how restricted they may be.
For its part, the UMP-run government should show more tolerance to the opposition and be more open to criticism. The ruling coalition should agree to re-establish trust among all political parties and engage in a broad-based dialogue with them in order to create a healthy divergence of ideas, ease leadership dilemmas and correct deficiencies. It should give greater powers to a more freely elected National Assembly and a more independent judiciary, ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully guaranteed and that social development programmes are rapidly implemented. The holding of elections that are free and fair is vital in order to deepen and strengthen democracy, but this needs to be preceded by reforms that level the political playing field, which previously have seemed inconceivable. Only then will all political parties have an equal opportunity to disseminate their ideas so that elections can be truly competitive.
Conclusion
According to the second census conducted in 2009, Djibouti has a total population of about 818 000 of whom 58 per cent resides in the capital city which has a population of 475 000. The population growth rate of Djibouti is estimated to be 3 per cent and nearly 52 per cent of the population is said to be under 20 years of age. The population is split into two ethnic groups, the Somali Issas and the Afars.
The Somalis including the Issas account for roughly 60 per cent of the population and the Afars account for 35 per cent, the remaining 5 per cent are French, Arab and Ethiopian. There is little available research on Djibouti’s history and internal politics. P Woodward, The Horn of Africa: politics and international relations, London: IB Tauris, 1996, 214. This situation report attempts to fill this gap, serving accordingly as both a source of information and a catalyst for further studies.
Aptidon was an Issa Somali of the Mamassan subclan. He was born in 1916 in Djibouti and had worked as a nurse and contractor. Aptidon represented Djibouti in the French Senate from 1952 to 1958 and in the French National Assembly from 1959 to 1962. He then returned to Djibouti to serve as Minister of Education under Ali Aref with whom he broke off relations in 1967 to lead the campaign against France.
He had no children of his own and died in 2006. More importantly, the government should acknowledge that repression can quell agitation only temporarily. Given the endemic poverty, degradation of livelihood sources, inequitable distribution of revenue, widespread corruption, human rights abuses and lack of real political reform, in the longer term repression will only spur on the very upheavals that the government wishes to avoid. The protests of February 2011 are a forewarning that at any moment the reservoir of repressed anger in Djibouti could conceivably erupt into a mass uprising.
In terms of regional politics, Djibouti’s tensions with Eritrea are very far from resolved. Worries about further Eritrean aggression have in part been fuelled by unsubstantiated accusations the Eritrea is providing support to Djiboutian armed groups. There is also a widespread belief among Djiboutians that Eritrea has yet to achieve its regional strategy, namely to re-establish its influence in the Horn of Africa, disrupt the Djibouti corridor and break the geo-political deadlock with Ethiopia.
Finally, in a business-as-usual manner, the US and France are set to discreetly maintain their military forces in Djibouti and to continue their unqualified support to Guelleh, thus fuelling the assumption that Djibouti’s stability rests on his leadership. In the global war on terrorism and the fight against piracy (neither of which are likely to abate in the next five to ten years) gaining the cooperation of accessible and relatively stable governments remains uppermost in current US and French policy towards the entire Horn of Africa region. A secondary priority for these two countries may be to contain Eritrea’s moves to sow instability in the region. While both the US and France preach the need for unfettered democracy, they contradict themselves when short-term priorities are at stake.
Author: Berouk Mesfin
Ibstitute of Security Studues
Contact: bmesfin@issafrica.org
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