Thursday 14 July 2011

COUNTER-PIRACY UPDATES



STATUS OF SEIZED VESSELS AND CREWS IN SOMALIA, THE GULF OF ADEN  AND THE INDIAN OCEAN (ecoterra - 14. July 2011)

PROTECTING AND MONITORING LIFE, BIODIVERSITY AND THE ECOSYSTEM IN SOMALIA AND ITS SEAS SINCE 1986 - ECOTERRA Intl.
ECOTERRA Intl. and ECOP-marine serve concerning the counter-piracy issues as advocacy groups in their capacity as human rights, marine and maritime monitors as well as in co-operation with numerous other organizations, groups and individuals as information clearing-house. In difficult cases we have successfully served as mediators.

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STATUS-SUMMARY:

Today, 14. July 2011, 20h00 UTC, at least 35 larger plus 17 smaller foreign vessels plus one stranded barge are kept in Somali hands against the will of their owners, while at least 585 hostages or captives - including a South-African yachting couple as well as a Danish yacht-family with three children and two friends - suffer to be released.
But even EU NAVFOR, who mostly only counts high-value, often British insured vessels, admitted now that many dozens of vessels were sea-jacked despite their multi-million Euro efforts to protect shipping.
Having come under pressure, EU NAVFOR's operation ATALANTA felt now compelled to publish their updated piracy facts for those vessels, which EU NAVFOR admits had not been protected from pirates and were abducted. EU NAVFOR also admitted in February 2011 for the first time that actually a larger number of vessels and crews is held hostage than those listed on their file.
Since EU NAVFOR's inception at the end of 2008 the piracy off Somalia started in earnest and it has now completely escalated. Only knowledgeable analysts recognized the link.

Please see the
situation map of the PIRACY COASTS OF SOMALIA (2011) and the CPU-ARCHIVE
ECOTERRA members can also request the Somali Marine & Coastal Monitor for background info.

- see also HELD HOSTAGE BY PIRATES OFF SOMALIA

and don't forget that SOMALI PIRACY IS CUT-THROAT CAPITALISM

WHAT THE NAVIES OFF SOMALIA NEVER SEE:
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/05/fighting_for_control_of_somali.html

What Foreign Soldiers in Somalia and even their Officers Never Seem to Realize:
The Scramble For Somalia

PEACE KEEPERS OR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS ?
SG Ban Ki-Moon (UN) and President Ram Baran Yadav (Nepal) should resign and take the responsibility for 4,500 Haitians having been killed by a Cholera strain introduced by unchecked, so-called UN Peace-Keepers from Nepal into Haiti.

LATEST:

STILL ALMOST 600 SEAFARERS ARE HELD HOSTAGE IN SOMALIA !
ECOTERRA Intl. has been the first group to clearly and publicly state that the piracy phenomenon off the Somali coasts can only become an issue of the past again, if tangible and sustainable, appropriate and holistic development for the coastal communities kicks in.
Solutions to piracy have to tackle the root causes: Abhorrent poverty, environmental degradation, injustice, outside interference. While still billions are spend for the navies, for the general militarization or for mercenaries or conferences, still no real and financially substantial help is coming forward to pacify and develop the coastal areas of Somalia.
Updates on known cases of piracy  - pls see also below this latest news in the status section.

Exclusive:
INDIAN LIVESTOCK VESSEL SEA-JACKED OFF SOMALIA
(ecop-marine)
Not yet officially confirmed reports from Puntland, the federal state in the North-East of Somalia, revealed that today (13. July 2011), the Indian cargo vessel MV AL ISHAM with 12 to 15 Indian and Pakistani crew and over 400 sheep on board was captured by Somali sea-shifta, who allegedly intend to use the vessel as piracy-launch. Other sources gave the name of the vessel as AL NASIR or AL NISAR and stated that the crew consists of 8 Pakistani and 7 Indian seafarers.
The attack happened just 48nm outside Bosaso harbour in the eastern part of the Gulf of Aden, local observers reported.
The ship also carried gum arabicum sold for export from Puntland.
None of the navies has reported, though insiders stated that the naval control centres are aware. The lack of proper reporting has become the naval standard, like in the MT Brillante Virtuoso, where EU NAVFOR even bluntly lied to bloomberg media and others.


©2011 - ecoterra / ecop-marine - articles above are exclusive reports and, if not specifically ©-marked, free for publication as long as cited correctly and the source is quoted.
The maritime articles below are cleared or commented. If you don't find a specific article, it most likely was not worth to be republished here, but if you feel we have overlooked an important publication, please mail it to us.

What you always wanted to know about piracy, but never dared to ask:
SEARCH THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE INTERNET PORTAL ON PIRACY

INCIDENT ALERT FOR RED SEA:
NATO reports:
JULY 13, 2011
Latitude: 12 44N Longitude: 043 18E
Alert Type: Attempted Attack  
At 0717UTC / 13 JUL 11 / a Pirate Attack Group consisting of 2 skiffs (weapons and ladder seen) was reported in position 12 44 N 043 18 E.  The vessel managed to evade.
IMB reports:
13.07.2011: 0717 UTC: Posn: 12:44N – 043:18E, Bab el Mandeb straits, Red Sea.
Pirates armed with guns in two skiffs chased and approached a chemical tanker underway. Master mustered crew and ship’s security team was deployed to the bridge wings. On sighting the security team, the pirates aborted the attack and moved away.


Iranian Warships Foil Attempted Hijack of Cargo Ship (FNA)
An attempt by the Somali pirates to hijack an Iranian bulk carrier was nipped in the bud after an Iranian fleet of warships present in the region rushed to the scene.
Iranian Navy Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Seyyed Mahmoud Mousavi announced that the Navy warships foiled the attack on a cargo ship in the Indian Ocean off the Southeast coast of Somalia in the Horn of Africa.
He added that the Iranian warships patrolling the area rushed to assist the cargo ship upon its distress call, which reported an unauthorized boarding attempt by several people.
Iranian Navy marines managed to foil the pirate attack on the merchant vessel after they engaged in a fire fight. No injuries were reported among the crews of the Iranian ships.
The Iranian Navy has been conducting anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since November 2008, when Somali raiders hijacked the Iranian-chartered cargo ship, MV Delight, off the coast of Yemen.
According to UN Security Council resolutions, different countries can send their warships to the Gulf of Aden and coastal waters of Somalia against the pirates and even with prior notice to Somali government enter the territorial waters of that country in pursuit of Somali sea pirates.
The Gulf of Aden - which links the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea - is an important energy corridor, particularly because Persian Gulf oil is shipped to the West via the Suez Canal.
N.B.: The case was not reported by NATO, EU NAVFOR or IMB

Iran Navy saves cargo ship from pirates (PressTV)
Iran's Navy warships have foiled a pirate attack on a cargo ship in the Indian Ocean off the southeast coast of Somalia in the Horn of Africa.
The lawless state has been without a functioning government ever since and the authority of the so-called Transitional Federal Government is limited mostly to the area around the capital city, Mogadishu.
The Iranian bulk carrier came under attack early on Sunday after a number of armed people on board several skiffs approached the carrier at high speed, said Iranian Navy Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Seyyed Mahmoud Mousavi, quoted by IRNA on Tuesday.
He added that the Iranian warships patrolling the area rushed to assist the cargo ship upon its distress call, which reported an unauthorized boarding attempt by several people.
Iranian Navy marines managed to foil the pirate attack on the merchant vessel after they engaged in a fire fight. No injuries were reported among the crews of the Iranian ships.
In line with international efforts against piracy, Iran's Navy has been conducting anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since November 2008 to safeguard maritime trade and in particular ships and oil tankers owned or leased by Iran.
International Maritime Organization (IMO) Secretary General Efthimios E. Mitropoulos described in May the anti-piracy efforts by Iran's Navy as “effective.”
Iran's Navy performs effectively in fighting pirates. The whole maritime community is undoubtedly indebted to those countries that have acted to counter piracy by deploying forces, Mitropoulos said.
The IMO chief also referred to the quick presence of Iran's naval forces in areas most vulnerable to pirate attacks and said he had previously expressed his gratitude for Iran's anti-piracy efforts in a letter to the Iranian ambassador to Britain.
Rampant piracy off the Indian Ocean coast of Somalia has made the waters among the most dangerous in terms of pirate activities.
The Gulf of Aden, which links the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea, is the quickest route for more than 20,000 vessels traveling annually between Asia, Europe and the Americas.
However, attacks by heavily armed Somali pirates on speedboats have prompted some of the world's largest shipping firms to switch routes from the Suez Canal and reroute cargo vessels around southern Africa, leading to climbing shipping costs.
Somalia has been in strife since 1991, when warlords overthrew former dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. Strategically located in the Horn of Africa, it has been embroiled in a bitter civil war for years.

Somali pirates : two cases this week in Dutch court By Saskia Houttuin (RNW)
It is a coincidence: for two days in a row Somali pirates stood trial in a Dutch court in Rotterdam. In both cases, the suspects were arrested by the Dutch Navy. On April 2nd the small vessel Hr. Ms. Tromp persued nine Somali pirates on the coast of Somalia. They are suspected for seizing an Iranian ship and attempted murder on Dutch Marines. Their trial started with a pro forma session last Monday. On Tuesday, in the same court, five Somali pirates faced the judge for seizing the South African yacht Choizil. They were stopped on the coast near Tanzania by the Dutch vessel ‘Amsterdam’.
First case: probably not until 2012
The case that began Monday against the nine suspects could take a while: the court wants to see all the audiovisual material made during the arrest and the shootings between the Somalians and the Dutch navy. The application was submitted to the Ministry of Defence. The court also wants the crew of the seized Iranian ship to testify. According to Pelle Biesmeijer, spokesman for the Rotterdam Court, it may take until next year before the hearing starts.
Second case: suspects deny
Unlike the first case, the Tuesday case against five Somali pirates seems to proceed faster. “As it now appears, the prosecutor will make a recommended sentence around end July. The verdict is due august 13th.” says Wim de Bruin, spokesman for the Dutch prosecution.
Allthough the suspects deny, two of the five suspects admitted they were on their way to hijack a boat, before they were stopped. According to the Dutch navy, the Somali’s were in a small boat with 15 others, after they got off the seized yacht. Before the Marines reached them, the suspects might have thrown the weapons they carried overboard. The other fifteen occupants were released earlier due to lack of evidence.

The Dutch Defence Ministry released a video showing the attack by the Netherlands Navy:

Video voor Windows Media Player  Video | wmv | 4:00 | 9.7MB
Video voor Apple Quicktime Player Video |  mp4 | 4:00 | 13MB

5 'pirates' on Dutch trial for SA couple's abduction By Camilla Bath (EyeWitnessNews)
Five suspected Somali pirates accused of abducting a South African couple are on trial in the Netherlands.
The trial started on Tuesday, some eight months after Bruno Pelizzari and Deborah Calitz were taken captive. They were sailing in a yacht off the east coast of Africa when their vessel was intercepted.
Five Somali nationals face up to 15 years in jail if the Dutch state successfully prosecutes the men.
During their appearance in Rotterdam, they were charged with sea robbery and piracy.
The Dutch prosecution department said the men were being tried under a law which gives the Netherlands international jurisdiction over piracy. The court will hand down a verdict in August.
Meanwhile, the families of the victims said their captors are demanding US$5 million (R35 million) for their release.


Pirate Attacks Grew 36 Percent in First Half 2011 by Peter T. Leach (JOC)
Somali pirates attack more, succeed less
There were 36 percent more international pirate attacks in the first half of 2011 compared to the same period in 2010, but Somali pirates’ hijacking success has fallen.
Pirate attacks on the world’s oceans totaled 266 in the first six months of 2011, up 36 percent from 196 attacks in the same period last year, according to a report released Wednesday by the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre.
Somali pirates were responsible more than 60 percent of the attacks, a majority of which were in the Arabian Sea area, according to the report, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”.
As of June 30, Somali pirates were holding 20 vessels and 420 crew and demanding ransoms of millions of dollars.
“In the last six months, Somali pirates attacked more vessels than ever before and they’re taking higher risks,” said IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan. “This June, for the first time, pirates fired on ships in rough seas in the Indian Ocean during the monsoon season. In the past, they would have stayed away in such difficult conditions."
Although Somali pirates are more active this year, mounting 163 attacks compared to 100 in the first six months of 2010, they managed to hijack fewer ships, 21 in the first half of 2011 compared with 27 in the same period last year. This, the report says, is due to tougher ships defenses and actions of international naval forces to disrupt pirate groups off the east coast of Africa.
In the first six months of 2011, many of the attacks have occurred east and northeast of the Gulf of Aden, an area navigated by crude oil tankers sailing from the Arabian Gulf, as well as other ships sailing into the Gulf of Aden. Since 20 May, pirates attacked 14 ships in the southern Red Sea.
Somali pirates took 361 sailors hostage and kidnapped 13 in the first six months of 2011. Worldwide, 495 seafarers were taken hostage.
Pirates killed seven people and injured 39. Ninety-nine vessels were boarded, 76 fired upon and 62 thwarted attacks were reported.
Ships, including oil and chemical tankers, are increasingly being attacked with automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenade launchers. Whereas five years ago pirates were just as likely to brandish a knife as a gun, guns were used in 160 attacks and knives in 35 attacks this year.
A surge in particularly violent and highly organized attacks has hit the coast of West Africa this year. The report listed 12 attacks on tankers off Benin since March, an area where no incidents were reported in 2010.

TO THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA:
"You come into our waters, you come to threaten us – the consequences will be deadly."
By Wolfgang H. Thome (eTN)
eTN speaks with Seychelles Minister Hon. Joel Morgan, Minister for Home Affairs, Environment, Energy and Transport Government
On occasion, an opportunity arises to interview high-ranking officials during my many trips across Eastern Africa or to the Indian Ocean islands, and recently, during a visit to the Seychelles, the Hon. Joel Morgan consented to be interviewed for eTN’s Executive Talk, discussing a range of issues, including the "Problem from Hell," aka ocean terrorism, aka Somali piracy, where the Minster expressed strong views, which should be embraced by more and clearly saying that defeating piracy is a matter of national survival for the Seychelles.
eTN: Mr. Minister, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about a range of issues of interest to eTN’s readers. You have at times been described as the "anti-piracy minister;" do you think this media slogan does your work any justice?
MINISTER MORGAN: I think is does do my work justice, yes I do. I am dedicating a lot of my time, nationally and internationally, to this problem and to combat it. I am doing it because it threatens my country, it is putting my country at risk, and the President has given me this responsibility. I am giving it my heart and soul to bring on board the international community, to sensitize our partners, to mobilize and galvanize support for Seychelles. Our President, in fact, championed the fight against piracy, and he was the first and remains at the forefront of our active diplomacy around the world to build a coalition with our partners to fight this menace. Piracy today is the single biggest threat to the entire region, and, in fact, not just to our region but to the entire international trade, which passes through our waters, our region using ships to import and export goods from around the world.
eTN: A major naval coalition was, of course, formed a few years ago to combat ocean terrorism, which is the phrase I use to describe the menace...
MINISTER MORGAN: I entirely agree with that!
eTN continues: ...which is perpetrated by a very small section of Somalis and their financiers and middle men, which has led to the unjustified broad condemnation of the Somali people as a whole. What has the naval coalition done for the Seychelles to secure your waters, to protect your economic exclusion zone, and what significant material support like naval and aerial assets, training, and other measures have friendly countries given to Seychelles to allow the country to also mount its own defense?
MINISTER MORGAN: Our partners have been very positive in the help they have provided to Seychelles, because they have seen that we are very proactive in our stand and reaction. We have taken and continue to take a very strong stand against piracy and to protect our national integrity and our rights, the rights of shipping to peacefully use the sea lanes, and as a result of President Michel’s leadership and his policies, the global community has come together and helps us, supports us. Our closest friends and allies have responded to our needs very well. For instance, the UAE have donated 5 naval assets to us, 5 ships our coast guard uses to patrol our waters alongside the naval coalition vessels to improve safe passage and security for ships. Previously, the UAE also donated an aircraft to us for surveillance, doing daily flights to gather information and direct surface vessels. India has just donated a new Dornier surveillance aircraft to Seychelles and has underwritten the use of another one until the new aircraft comes off the assembly line for delivery, also allowing for training of our own personnel. This aircraft is actually armed and contains state-of-the-art equipment assisting us in pinpointing positions and comes to the aid of vessels in distress. In addition, India has donated to us 2 big navy vessels, which we use alongside the others to patrol and safeguard our waters, our fishermen, and our islands.
The UAE is also assisting us in building a totally new major coast guard base for our ships and as a control and command center complemented by a radar surveillance system covering all our key islands to allow for early detection of any threat to our national waters and our national security, be it pirates or other groups.
China is delivering to us 2 Y12 aircraft, also fully and state-of-the-art equipped, which will very much expand our reach and allow for constant around-the-clock airborne monitoring, surveillance, and directions for NavFor and Seychellois surface ships.
eTN: Is it a matter of national survival for the Seychelles to defeat the ocean terrorists?
MINISTER MORGAN: It is a matter of national survival for some of the key aspects of our national economy, tourism, fishing, and trade. We depend heavily on ships moving freely across our waters, into our port, and transiting with their cargos to Asia, to Africa, and beyond.
eTN: I was pleased to see a large cruise liner calling on Port Victoria today, and I understand this is now a very rare event compared with the old days when Port Victoria was a "must visit" destination for any cruise ship sailing the Indian Ocean. Security assessments have changed the classic Indian Ocean cruises from or to the Seychelles via Mombasa, Zanzibar, Mauritius, and South Africa, and all the exotic places in between, and the cruise companies are very afraid of one of their cruise liners coming under attack or even being captured, especially in view of several pirate groups being closely linked with militants like Al Shabab, sharing proceeds, and in case of a cruise ship capture, likely sharing the hostages.
MINISTER MORGAN: I agree with you there, about the links and the sharing of proceeds.
eTN: What options does the Seychelles government have to secure the sea lanes to bring the cruises back, to return 10 of millions of US dollars in tourism and related revenues to the Indian Ocean ports from Victoria to Mombasa and along the Eastern coastline of Africa. Is it possible to "shadow" the passenger cruisers from when they enter critical waters to the time they reach port?
MINISTER MORGAN: This is not viable, the area is vast is huge, which the different forces patrol and the naval assets are spread out already, so allocating additional surface assets is not possible. However, what has proven to be very, very effective and which has been pioneered here in the Seychelles, is the "vessel protection detachment," which is putting trained and armed personnel on board of these ships until they reach safe waters again. We started this with fishing boats, our own boats, but also the Spanish and the French, and it has proven an effective deterrent against pirates capturing any of those boats so protected. After analyzing the results, we are now pushing for more such detachments to be placed on ships because the deterrent does work - not one of the ships so protected was captured by pirates.
We are now talking to cruise lines and are telling them that as they are losing a lot of market and revenue by avoiding our area, avoiding calling on the Seychelles, that with the right measures this is doable. Yes, there is an ongoing risk, but it can be minimized, reduced to almost zero, with the right precautions.
eTN: It is our understanding that you have UAVs based at the Mahe International Airport, none of which are presently armed. They could be armed?
MINISTER MORGAN: Yes, they could be armed.
eTN: Do you have any plans in that direction to increase your deterrent and ability to respond to incidents or prevent incidents, increase the risks for pirates to actually come out from their own territorial waters and try it on?
MINISTER MORGAN: The UAVs belong to the Unites States Army, and they are here under an agreement we have with the United States of America to operate missions for anti-piracy surveillance. They principally gather intelligence information, which they feed back to the US and share with us here in the Seychelles and NavFor members about locations of suspected pirate motherships and skiffs. The agreements we have in place right now with them does not provide for the arming of the UAVs at this point in time.
But what Seychelles now has is our own aerial assets, aircraft which are armed like the Dornier we have from India, and the new one we are getting from them. And under our own rules of engagement, we can and will use armed force against pirates when our own aircraft are involved in surveillance or coming to the assistance of vessels in distress and when the crew deems it necessary to either deter or neutralize the threat posed by such pirates.
eTN: You mentioned you have your own rules of engagement here in the Seychelles. Under these rules you have staged several successful rescue missions for which you must be congratulated, of course. It must have taken some courage to actually give your commanders on site the go and leave it to them to act as they were trained to do. You used your new naval and aerial assets well and were widely praised for your robust response, but you were also criticized, including by a few members of the naval coalition calling it a "risky strategy." One particular source of criticism suggested it would cause a hardening of actions by pirates when they have captives on board after seizing a vessel. Will you in the face of such critiques continue with your robust handling of pirates when they are encountered on the ocean?
MINISTER MORGAN: Most definitely we will continue with our line of robust responses. In fact, we will not only continue, but intensify, our responses and actions. Our message to the Somali pirates is very clear: you come into our waters, you come to threaten us, our territory, our citizens, our livelihood, our economy – the consequences will be deadly.
eTN: Why, in your opinion, then are certain members of the naval coalition so loath to engage the ocean terrorists as decisively as you do? A few have stopped pondering and diddling about and equally started to engage them robustly, too, but generally with the vast superiority of assets and equipment, for monitoring and surveillance they have, they let the Chandlers be taken hostage standing by watching as London did not give the commander on site the approval to move in and prevent it. Doesn’t that show that the naval coalition needs to sit down and agree on a new set of robust rules of engagement, leaving the decisions to their commanders on site rather than making political decisions in the European capitals?
MINISTER MORGAN: I believe so, in fact, I have been propagating a change of the rules of engagement by the different partners in the naval coalition and amongst naval detaches directly deployed to the area to safeguard the shipping of that particular country. We must stop pondering and must move on to action. Had we done that a year ago already, I firmly believe that the Somali pirates would have seen a really strong deterrent and it would have had a big impact on the level of attacks we have seen since then. They would have known very clearly, if they take innocent people hostage at open sea, then they would face deadly consequences. The fact that this has not happened yet has been like an open door...
eTN: Has it encouraged the ocean terrorists?
MINISTER MORGAN: Of course it has, of course, it has been like an open door for them, and even if they are captured at sea, caught in a skiff, they are disarmed and put ashore in Somalia, they are back on the ocean within a week. Here in Seychelles, we have evidence that people we have captured were involved in previous hijackings, got caught and were released back to Somalia and went back out to sea again.
eTN: Uganda, where I come from, has the most troops based in Somalia under the AU’s peace keeping force, and our President has on several occasions demanded that Somalia has to be under a total sea and air blockade to have the mission succeed first before embarking on the economic reconstruction of Somalia, create jobs for young people instead of see them join Al Shabab or the pirates. Do you think a naval and air blockade would help you in your fight on the ocean when the militants and pirates are actually uprooted from their safe havens on land?
MINISTER MORGAN: We need to be smart how we tackle the problem of Somalia and the problem of piracy. It is clear that the state of anarchy in Somalia has to be brought under control, and the structures of government have to come in to stabilize the country, to have governance, to have infrastructure rebuilt to have the economy restart, create employment and opportunities, although this is a long-term process.
The immediate problem we have is dealing with terrorism from Al Shabab within Somalia and its links with Al Qaida, which have now been proven and, of course, also the problem of piracy, which in my mind is also linked to financing Al Shabab. I am convinced that one way or another the proceeds or part of the proceeds from piracy, the ransom payments, not only go to the businessmen who are behind the piracy, but they are also paying Al Shabab for various favours, for protection, for their rackets and their scams. What we need to do is to stop the flow of arms into Somalia. This is big money! Big international companies, which supposedly offer security services within Somalia are in my opinion involved in the arms trade into Somalia...
eTN: In arms trafficking?
MINISTER MORGAN: In arms trafficking, both small and big arms. I think the international community, especially the countries of the EU, the United States and other countries like Russia, for instance, need to tackle this problem, take it very seriously, as well as the UN, of course. They all need to clamp down on the supply of arms into Somalia. The second thing which needs to happen is that international institutions involved in combating financial crimes need to go after the money flow, after the people who finance piracy. Because piracy has become a business. It has become a business for people anywhere, they sit in Europe, they sit in all four corners of the globe. They are putting money into financing piracy because it provides huge returns. It is no longer just a question of pirates getting into skiffs, going on the ocean to hijack ships for ransom, it has become an "organized crime."
eTN: The capabilities exist to do this, there are global agreements to disrupt and end the financing of terrorism...
MINISTER MORGAN: Yes, this is just another face of terrorism! The money which ends up in the hands of financiers of piracy is used to traffic narcotics, to traffic arms, to traffic humans – it fuels the international terrorism process. We must not be naïve and say these are just people making money, yes, they are making money, they are profiteering from piracy, but they are using such money to pay for other things, as organized crime syndicates.
eTN: So you think those syndicates and godfathers have a clear agenda?
MINISTER MORGAN: Evidently they do, and whoever believes otherwise must be naïve!
eTN: In recent months, pirates have landed and been arrested in Tanzania and other parts of Eastern Africa, even Indian Ocean island it has been reported. Those in Tanzania were spotted and arrested as they came ashore trying to commandeer fuel and supplies. The Seychelles with 115 islands and the extensive geographical spread across the Indian Ocean is a vast area to secure. Can you assure the public that your islands are safe and you have put all measures in place to ensure no pirates are going to land on your shores, your islands, and that your own people and the tourist visitors are safe?
MINISTER MORGAN: I can assure you that our people and visitors are safe. We have in place all required plans and taken measures to effectively and efficiently tackle any attempted landing by any pirates on our inhabited islands, and even on uninhabited islands we now have measures in place to prevent such. I am not saying it is impossible, please let that be very clear, but we have done everything humanly possible to prevent such an incident from happening in the Seychelles, and we are confident we have the ability to deal with such situations.
eTN: Thank you for your time Minister.

Somalia’s pirates: Ransom cash 'Easy come easy go' by Mohamed Shiil (AHN)
As the piracy phenomenon broke out in Somalia, many ordinary fishermen abandoned their nets and fish hooks and took up what they saw as an easy source of luxury.Millions of dollars in cash flowed into the hands of the -- usually -- young men, so much so that they lived a life of “easy come, easy go.”
Today, they are empty-handed. Lawlessness and overwhelming unemployment in Somalia forced many young men into piracy, yet today many of them in the Puntland region are looking for other ways of earning a living.
A professional fisherman, Jama Heyraan, said that he had abandoned fishing for the last two years in his home town of Eyl, which was a haven for pirates. The ancient hamlet of 19,000 inhabitants had been dramatically changed as the piracy trade created a boom in the purchase of luxury cars, the construction of new apartments and a steady flow of currency.
Two of Heyraan's sons were implicated in piracy activities.
“My elder son acquired a lot of money from piracy, especially the Saudi tanker. He was engaged in the hijack of at least three vessels. He later procured three luxury vehicles, those known as 'Leyla Alawi,' and had set up a big commercial site for the family." However, the son spent almost all of his money on khat, a stimulant leaf, and for fuel for the boat he used in the hijackings.
Heyraan said that his elder son spent $340,000 for khat and $500,000 for fuel.
Most of the ransom paid to the pirates goes to investors who provide up-front money for the purchase of boats, fuel, food and weapons.
Before launching attacks on vessels passing the Somalia coastline and through the Gulf of Aden, pirates spend weeks in small speed boats transporting additional fuel and food supplies, using funds given in advance by the investors.
During a hijacking, investors provide whatever the pirates need: cigarettes, wine, marijuana and even women. Afterward, the money men demand a hundred-fold refund.
“Investors take advantage of pirates and businessmen on the ground," Heyraan said.
While in action, pirates use expensive satellite telephones and must hire translators’ for mediations about ransoms and even for talking to the media.
A young man, a former pirate who spoke on condition that he not be identified, said that his piracy enabled him spend leisure time in the port city of Garowe driving a new luxury car, with two young girls at his side and hundreds of thousands of dollars in his pockets. He gave hundreds of dollars to friends whenever they got together.
Now he's empty handed. Every penny from the hijack mission has disappeared.
“It is devil’s wealth, money obtained from piracy has no use at all,” the man said. “ I had got a lot of it, but I don’t know where it has gone, and the other pirates are the same as I am, easy come, easy go..it is true.”

Contact Group on Piracy off Somalia to Meet at UN (Xinhua)
The Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia will meet at the United Nations on Thursday, the U.S. State Department said on Wednesday.
The meeting, hosted by Singapore, will join partners from nearly 70 countries, international organizations and the private sector in New York for a plenary meeting of the 60-nation group.
The department described the group as "a growing diplomatic effort that is taking action against criminal activity that threatens commerce and humanitarian aid deliveries along one of the world's busiest shipping corridors," saying that since its initial meeting in January 2009, the group has nearly tripled in size, highlighting the global consensus on the shared security challenge posed by piracy, and on the need for further concerted and coordinated international action.

Piracy at Sea Reaching the Executive Decision By Lew Knopp (TheMaritimeExecutive)
Maritime piracy, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, consists of any criminal acts of violence, detention, rape, or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or aircraft that is directed on the high seas against another ship, aircraft, or against persons or property on board a ship or aircraft.
Confusion and clouding of this definition is due to some jurisdictions identifying armed robbery aboard ship as just that. It seems that the current trend of the various counter-piracy policies is to downplay shipboard robbery and similar events to reduce the severity of these crimes in the public’s eyes in order to control insurance premiums.
The romantic thought of Brave men in Spanish galleons with sabers drawn attacking lone ships laden with treasure have given way to the reality of men in small boats chasing, catching, and boarding large cargo ships. These men are neither brave nor romantic. They are desperate, fearful and they are pirates. The most commonly covered, and “world familiar”, are the modern Somali, Malaysian, and Caribbean pirates. While some pirates are simple fishermen unhappy with commercial intrusion into their territories, many pirates are criminals seeking money to fund much larger interests.
With the recent successes in pirate attacks coupled with the international media coverage, the industry is reported to be growing exponentially.  Current piracy trends seem to suggest that modern terrorist organizations are financing and providing material support to further enable pirate capability and reach. The modern terrorist realizes that they can recruit the poor and desperate to deliver their political and religious will through piracy. Drug Cartels worldwide have also started to get into the mix finding piracy as a way to finance their efforts. With terror groups entering into partnerships with drug cartels, the increased connectivity of drug cartels and piracy becomes apparent and can be seen in the waters off the coasts of countries like Burma, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Brazil, and the Caribbean Islands. Alarmingly, there have been reports in the aforementioned countries, of the presence of Mexican cartel, various piracy, and Middle Eastern and Pacific Rim terrorist elements previously only recorded in the regions they were known to exist in. This sheds light on their global networking success and the growth of their respective industries as a whole.
What is the Pirate’s “Risk versus Reward” rational?
Currently, reports have Somali pirates holding 26 vessels and over 518 people for ransom with another 7 vessels and 200 crewmembers held worldwide. Various estimates put the total global amount of ransom demanded at 1-3 Billion (U.S.).
This does not mean their demands are met however.  Pirates demanded, negotiated for and received $238million in 2010.  With average ransom payments of $5.4million in 2010, one researcher claims the overall cost of piracy worldwide could be as high as $12billion per year. Add to the industry’s burden of $3 billion a year in war risk coverage, the cost of naval operations off the Somali coast alone at $2 billion and costs for piracy trials and imprisonment around $31 million, 2011 looks to be a year that could cost sea trade over 17 billion dollars.
Total number of Pirates killed in the last 36 months is unconfirmed at less than 60.  Pirate crews receive promise of money, food, protection, and other enticements to engage in attacks on ships and kidnapping of crewmembers. With propaganda and rumors of riches, there are no shortages of men willing to engage in these crimes. Additionally, governments are pressuring each other for the capturing, trial and imprisonment of pirates rather than fighting them openly and either killing them or capturing and executing them. This too makes the risk they take more attractive to them. As far as the numbers go, weather effects in the form of draught in Somalia may have temporarily reduced the piracy attempts there, but with outside support, their efforts will continue in areas farther from their shores.
The problems with international law and it’s adherence to all countries equally is the host of mitigating factors making outcomes of seaborne conflicts uncertain. Thus those engaging in acts of piracy have the element of confusion, lack of cooperation and procedural understanding between countries enabling criminals to extend their reach capabilities, many times unchallenged.
The IMO and dozens of other national and international organizations broadcast their interests in favor of cooperation. As part of this effort, visiting naval vessels at sea in the warning regions have agreed to allow foreign shipriders aboard their vessels for the purpose of liaison with host territories. This further complicates the handling of engagement, capture and handling of pirates and international criminals. Additionally; vessel boarding by naval or police personnel is only permitted under very strict guidelines. The pirates, of course, do not recognize these guidelines.
Pirates operating near the horn of Africa are extending their range out to as far as the coast of India. The use of captured “Mother-ships” (previously private yachts, fishing trawlers, or work boats) as long range support craft for the deployment of smaller “attack craft” is on the rise. Pirates can easily cruise faster than a larger vessel, and catch and then shadow a vessel. Smaller craft are then fueled, and launched with 10 to 20 men on board to make an attempted boarding. Where previously, smaller boats carrying fewer men could be repelled with fire hoses, and other vessel mounted equipment and techniques, motherships can now supply a coordinated attack with more men to overwhelm the ship’s crew. Because many crewmembers are untrained or unequipped to personally take on these men, and because they must follow their company’s policies, these newer methods of attack are providing greater success for piracy and fueling confidence for further attempts.
While many companies have enforced their policies of not fighting or not resisting, others have decided to place armed security teams aboard their vessels. As much as many companies are sworn against arming their vessels, of the ones who have decided to place armed security teams aboard their vessels, none has been successfully boarded or experienced loss of life to the crew or security team due to piracy. An additional consideration is the cost of placing armed security teams aboard vessels and allowing the fuel savings from slower cruising speeds to offset the cost of the added security.
The goal of modern pirates is to take the ship, the crew or the cargo intact, or simply to defend themselves while they rob the crew or vessel.  There are arguably two reasons for the pirates not to escalate the use of more sophisticated or powerful weapons:
  • Destroying the vessel or cargo would be counterproductive, and killing the crew would bring international retribution
  • Obtaining and operating these weapons, and acquiring training is currently cost prohibitive.
Pirates to date are armed with Russian or Chinese style assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades, pistols and for the most part, Machetes and knives. It is only a matter of time before they gain the financial means and support to acquire more sophisticated weapons, technology, equipment and training. Until they do, consider a few factors:
  • The average range for a pirate’s rifle is 500 meters on smaller craft that lack the stability for precision marksmanship.
  • Armed security details are equipped with precision weapons capable of accuracy out to 800 to 1800 meters on a semi-stable ship’s deck. These marksmen are traditionally military trained professionals with many from the world’s elite special forces.
  • If security teams in the form of well disciplined, trained, equipped and paid private contractors are placed on a vessel with strict rules of engagement, pirate attacks would be reduced or abandoned outside of the range of their weapons, reducing risk to the crew.
  • Available technology and resources which the pirates don’t have; water cannons, sonic cannons (LRAD), nets, razor wire, electrified wire, evasive maneuvers, and the addition of warships and coastal patrols by international coast guards.
With all of the defensive tools and methods available to a vessel, the chances of a security team needing to fire directly at prates are greatly reduced. If a quality contractor is chosen, liability to the ship owner, leaser, and other stakeholders will be greatly diminished.
So how do I choose a qualified contractor? First, here is who you don’t want;
A ship is not a desert or a mountain, or a forest. Conventionally trained land warriors or the guy who was guarding a grocery store a month ago is not who you want on your vessel. Policemen, while experts in law enforcement, are seldom trained or conditioned for sea battle much less the hours of standing on a moving deck looking out at a small speck which might be a threat. Mercenaries are strictly in it for the money and many will flee before fighting if to live to fight another day. Their backgrounds are difficult to verify and they are many times very aggressive and unrefined.
A legitimate company with significant quantities of trained personnel, seaworthy weaponry and sound tactical understanding of the maritime domain is your answer. These companies have strict hiring criteria focusing on training and fitness similar in fact to those of the United States Navy SEALs. Many employed are either former US Navy SEALs or British SBS experienced operators. There are less then a dozen legitimate maritime security companies in the world who possess this expertise. The advantages of having these experts on your vessels require minimal explanation. They possess great discipline, team spirit with keen situation and domain adaptability to changes in the environment. These maritime security specialists greatest advantage over land operators employed in maritime security contractor role is that they have thousands of hour’s at sea onboard vessels. They are self supporting totally focused on the mission. Their goal is to allow safe passage of the vessel. They defend and their presence is intended to deter rather than provoke. However, should it be required, these maritime security specialist can attack, defend, operate and navigate vessels. They understand small craft operations and piracy boarding techniques and tactics.
For additional information on choosing an up to date security program for your fleet or vessel, look to references and experience. Make the decision.
References:
International Crime Commission
International Maritime Organization
International Maritime Bureau
BIMCO Bulletin
Fairplay International Shipping Weekly
Fairplay Solutions
Lloyd’s List
MER
Naval Architect
Navigation News
Ports & Harbours
Safety at Sea International
Seaways
Shipping World & Shipbuilder
Tanker Operator
TradeWinds
Titan Maritime
N.B.: MarEx does not necessarily endorse the opinions herein.

SOS to naval ships as pirates bother buoys By Ben Cubby (SMH)

THE CSIRO has called in the US Navy to protect its climate change research from pirates.
A vast section of the Indian Ocean has become too dangerous for scientific vessels because of armed raiders attacking ships off the coast of Somalia.
It means that the international program for measuring ocean temperature and sea level rise, with robotic buoys, is missing data which would help scientists better understand not only global warming but also Australian weather patterns.
''There is a large hole in the area that we can cover, due to the pirates,'' Ann Thresher, a senior scientist in the CSIRO's Division of Marine and Atmospheric Research, said. ''We normally deploy the devices off cargo ships, but these vessels are now avoiding the area and sailing along coasts to avoid the pirates.''
After aborted attempts to send a chartered sailing vessel into the pirate zone, an operation to deploy the research buoys from a US Navy warship is now under way.
The Royal Australian Navy will join the research operation later this year, with an Anzac frigate deploying a series of CSIRO buoys across the Indian Ocean on its way to a tour of duty in the Persian Gulf.
Pirate attacks have taken place almost every week this year, and last week three accused pirates who had been detained and brought to the US were charged with murder after four people aboard a cruise were killed in February.
Australian researchers play a central part in the international ocean monitoring effort known as Argo, under which thousands of buoys are deployed around the world.
The buoys, which cost about $15,000 each, sink to a depth of one or two kilometres, gathering data about water temperature and salinity. They surface every 10 days and broadcast their findings to a satellite, providing updates on currents and weather, as well as changes in ocean chemistry used to measure climate change.
''The problem for us is that the floats leak, or they could hit the bottom, or they could get picked up by people, so they have to be replenished if we are going to have broad scale coverage of the ocean,'' Dr Thresher said.
The pirate danger area, reaching out about 2000 kilometres from the Somali coast, is a key zone for determining Australian weather, Dr Thresher said.
The Indian Ocean Dipole is a sea temperature oscillation thought to function in a similar way to the El Nino-La Nina oscillation, which was partly responsible for the wild weather that hit the Queensland coast earlier this year.
N.B.: The probability that Somali sea-shifta would pick up these research buoys is rather minimal today. Somali fishermen used to collect the satellite-buoys, which especially Japanese and other industrial fishing fleets used to follow the large tuna shoals, but with more and more dangerous objects floating in these waters usually the buoys are not touched these days. The proactive way forward would be to engage Somali scientists and the Somali vessels to dispatch new buoys to replace those who got damaged or to study the Somali current in the Indian Ocean with the important upwellings.

Shutting down Suez Canal would be a serious economic threat, say experts (DailyNewsEgypt)
Fear that protesters in Suez will disrupt the flow of maritime traffic in the Suez Canal were dispelled Sunday by director of the Suez Canal Authority Ahmed Al Manakhly in a phone in to a state TV program, when he said that despite demonstrations and sit-ins, traffic in the waterway is moving regularly, Egynews.net reported. He added that the authority is working around the clock in cooperation with the armed forces in order to ensure that operations continue unaffected.
According to Al Manakhly, the constant threats worry ship owners and could cause them to take alternative routes, which in turn threatens the “national security” of the country. Revenue from Egypt's Suez Canal rose 16 percent year on year to $445.2 million in June, up 2 percent from a month earlier, a government portal showed on Sunday. Revenue in June 2010 was $383.7 million. In May 2011 it was $436.6 million. Alaa Ezz, secretary general of the Federation of Egyptian Chambers, told Daily News Egypt that the mere thought of shutting down or affecting productivity in the Canal is a matter that must be taken seriously. “We are talking about something that can affect our national sovereignty, not only will the workers not get raises, but the entire country will be harmed,” said Ezz. The Suez Canal is the highest generator of foreign currency, along with tourism and gas exports, as well as remittance from Egyptians living abroad. But with the country’s foreign investments and tourism revenues plummeting sharply, experts say the affects of such strikes on the country’s economy could be disastrous. “Canal revenues constitute about 3 percent of GDP, and are a significant earner of foreign currency, this is key at a time when foreign currency reserves have fallen from $36.6 billion in December to $26.6 billion in June,” said Mike Millar, head of research at Naeem Holding. According to Ezz, pushing for such strikes at this time will do nothing for the workers or the country. “There are legitimate demands of a lot of people, we can’t deny that, but it is a matter of timing,” he said. “You could increase salaries by 50 percent and just print more money, but what you would see is inflation because productivity won’t change.” In order for salaries to increase, the economy first needs to bounce back from the effects of the revolution, which halted productivity, shut down the stock market for two months, and scared away foreign investment along with tourism. “We have to first get the economy back in place and then start demanding mass increases, tourism has to come back, foreign direct investment needs to come, then the trickle effect will bring the economy back, but not before,” said Ezz. According to Ezz, unless there are huge “mistakes” in salaries where workers are not making enough to meet their basic needs, then there cannot be a huge increase in wages at the moment. “Everyone gets paid according to their experience and their productivity,” he added. “People assuming that everyone should be equal is not realistic, this will never happen, this is communism and this is why communism fails.” Nonetheless, he believes that some companies should revise their workers’ wages in order to reach social justice. “You can’t have people so underpaid that they cannot even live, while they watch others acquire vast amounts of money,” he added. In just one month, Suez Canal Shipyards Co., one of the most important revenue generators for the waterway lost LE 30 million, about $5 million, as workers continue striking, according to Khalid Saleh, a representative speaking on behalf of the Suez Canal Shipyard’s Workers’ Union. “We don’t want these losses, nobody wants them because they affect us all, but this is the option we have had to resort to,” said Saleh. Until the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Suez Canal Authority give the workers a clear timeline stating when and how their demands will be met, the union will continue affecting productivity in an “open” sit-in, Saleh said. Their requests included an immediate 40 percent salary increase, better working conditions, and better life and health insurance plans. After their meeting with Admiral Ahmed Fadel, the head of the Suez Canal Authority, Saleh said that he was optimistic that their demands would be met very soon. Among the demands of the workers is for their detained colleagues who participated in previous sit-ins to be released. Just last week, military police arrested five workers at companies affiliated with the Suez Canal Authority who had been on strike since June 14. Aside from workers’ sit-ins, thousands of Suez residents have been demanding justice for the injured and the families of those killed during the early days of the January 25 Revolution. This Friday, July 8, protesters called for open strikes and sit-ins until the demands of the revolution are met, accusing the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of violating victims’ rights and calling for the overthrow of the head of SCAF and Egypt’s de facto president, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawy. About 50 ships cross the canal daily, which constitutes about eight percent of global transport and $1.2 billion annually in revenues for Egypt.

Monchegorsk: Cyprus explosion WikiLeaks (FoC)
US GOVERNMENT cables disclosed by WikiLeaks earlier this week depict a Cyprus government overwhelmed by the Monchegorsk incident of early 2009, with Nicosia said to be “looking for a way out” of a diplomatic nightmare that had snuck up on it.
Those are the broad strokes. But the WikiLeaks documents - classified communications between the State Department and the US Embassy in Nicosia - provide a blow-by-blow account of what was transpiring behind the scenes.
A cable dated January 29, 2009, from then US Ambassador to Cyprus Frank Urbancic, reads: “The RoC [Republic of Cyprus] is clearly feeling the heat and wants to avoid a confrontation with Syria and Iran. [Leonidas] Pantelides [head of the President’s diplomatic office] worries, with reason, that the Monchegorsk incident will break soon into the contentious Cypriot press, and he is looking for a way out before it becomes an embarrassment to the government.”
A subsequent cable, dated 16 April 2009, looks back to Cyprus’ cooperation with the international community as having been “half-hearted.” It reads: “Cyprus's new direction under Christofias has made final resolution of the M/V Monchegorsk incident problematic. Only a full-court international press from the UN Security Council and EU convinced Cyprus to summon the vessel to port for a more thorough inspection and eventual seizure of the cargo.
“Subsequent RoC cooperation with the UN's Iran Sanctions Committee (ISC) has been half-hearted…”
In a cable (January 27, 2009) titled “Cyprus Washing Hands of M/V Monchegorsk?” from the US Embassy here to the State Department, Urbancic attributes Cyprus’ dithering to fears of “Cyprus Problem-related ‘reprisals’ from Damascus”. He goes on to add that Nicosia “hopes to avoid having to interdict and/or divert to an RoC port the M/V Monchegorsk.”
In the same communication, Urbancic says Pantelides informed him that “Cyprus had requested the ship's owner to radio the master to divert to Limassol, but as yet had received no response. ‘This is all that we can do’, Pantelides insisted.”
The cable notes, however, that the US National Security Agency, which was tracking the ship’s communications, discovered otherwise: “NSA contacts report the ship has not received or transmitted radio messages recently.”
Further on, Urbancic comments on why Cyprus was getting “cold feet” (his words): “Greek Cypriots learn Security Council resolutions like others learn their ABCs - early and by heart. No country pays more lip service to their status at the top of the international pyramid. Why, then, the seeming disregard for RoC obligations under 1747 and 1803?”
He goes on: “Contacts ranging from President Christofias to worker bees at the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] informed us that Cyprus's 2006 decision to interdict the M/V Gregorio, a vessel carrying missile radar equipment from North Korea to Syria, had caused grave damage to its bilateral relations with Damascus. The Syrians had responded by green-lighting regular ferry service between Latakeia and the ‘occupied’ port of Famagusta in the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.’ Highest-level RoC entreaties have failed to compel Damascus to end the sea link, one of the few clear diplomatic blows the Cypriots have taken recently. They worry that further government action against the Monchegorsk might provoke Damascus to take further steps to ‘upgrade’ the ‘TRNC’.”
The leaked US government documents also shed light on some Cypriot officials’ belief that the Syrians would not back off their demands. Dionysis Dionysiou, Middle East Desk Officer at the Foreign Ministry, who had accompanied former Foreign Minister Erato Markoulli on an official visit to Damascus in late 2007, was convinced the Syrians were playing “hardball”. According to Dionysiou’s reading of the situation, “They [the Syrians] felt they had Cyprus in a corner, emboldened by the RoC recently having broken EU consensus to support a UNGA resolution on the Golan Heights. No end-state other than an RoC decision to let the vessel proceed to Latakeia would satisfy the SARG [Syria], Dionysiou predicted. Should that not occur, the Syrians would look to upgrade further their relations with the breakaway ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, and lobby hard on the ‘TRNC's’ behalf within the OIC [Organisation of the Islamic Conference].”
Focus then shifted on the fate of the ship’s cargo, with Nicosia insisting that any actions it takes must have “UN cover”.
With pressure mounting on Cyprus to take decisive action, the government came up with this idea. According to Urbancic, Pantelides “floated the possibility of transferring the cargo to the United Nations in some creative way. UNFICYP likely was out, owing to its restrictive mandate; also, transfer to UNFICYP likely would require bringing the materiel on land, which the government hoped to avoid. But might UNIFIL [the UN force in Lebanon] be a possibility? Pantelides ventured. That UN mission runs its sea operations out of Limassol. He questioned whether the Monchegorsk's haul could be transferred to a German ship operating under the UN flag, and taken out of Cyprus.”
Urbancic said he “welcomed the creative thinking and promised to follow up with Washington. He emphasized that the aim of the USG was not to punish Cyprus, but to prevent an illegal Iranian arms export.”
The cables also shed light on the US’ carrot-and-stick approach toward Cyprus. On January 29, 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advised the US Embassy here:
“If the ship arrives in Syria, without the ROC's best efforts to support the relevant UNSCRs, the USG would not be able to portray the ROC's actions in the most positive light,” Clinton says.
Meanwhile, the Syrians were working in the wings to influence Cyprus’ decision. An Urbancic email dated January 30, 2009 informs that “Damascus had deployed a high-level envoy to Nicosia, the Syrian Deputy FM, who was applying significant pressure to allow the vessel to depart for Latakeia.”
Urbancic notes that Cypriot maritime officials had conducted a cursory check of the Monchegorsk and discovered significant quantities of high explosives that were “clearly military in nature”.
He goes on to summarise the Cypriot approach: “Should the RoC's attorneys determine the cargo was subject to UNSC sanctions, the overarching Cypriot desire was to remove it soonest from the island, owing to ‘heavy pressure’ from Damascus and Teheran.”
A February 2 cable from the US Embassy describes a conversation between Pantelides and Urbancic: “Pantelides was more blunt than usual in replying. ‘Cyprus will not be able to withstand the pressure much longer, and has to find a way out,’ he claimed, noting that Monchegorsk stories were now dominating local media.”
Pantelides conveyed also to the US Ambassador that “there was no doubt the Monchegorsk was carrying proscribed materiel. That said, Cyprus needed ‘a blue flag (United Nations) solution,’ or otherwise would prefer to send the cargo back to source country Iran.”
On February 13 the ship finally docked at the port of Limassol: “Unloading of the vessel commenced at 0800 and ended at 1030; Emboffs [US Embassy officials] counted 98 containers off-loaded. Port authority contacts report that many of them will remain at quayside for an indeterminate time, as limited truck availability will make cargo transfer to the naval facility at Mari a lengthy and complex undertaking..”
On the same day “a mid-level Foreign Ministry contact told PolChief [US Embassy Political Chief] …that the government was pleased with recent developments on the Monchegorsk matter, as were ‘all major players.’ Pressed to confirm that that list included Syria and Iran, the Cypriot diplomat nodded affirmatively and added, ‘it seems so’.” here earlier.


From the SMCM (Somali Marine and Coastal Monitor): (and with a view on news with an impact on Somalia)
The articles below - except where stated otherwise - are reproduced in accordance with Section 107 of title 17 of the Copyright Law of the United States relating to fair-use and are for the purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions held by ECOTERRA Intl.
Articles below were vetted and basically found to report correctly - or otherwise are commented.

Somalis say:
NO TO UN-TRUSTEESHIP OVER SOMALIA OR AU AND IGAD MILITARIZATION

NO to military governance on land or naval governance on the Somali seas.

Somalia Is Not a State By Timothy A. Ridout* (HuffPost)
Most think of Somalia as a single entity, but it needs to be conceptualized in terms of three distinct regions: Somaliland, Puntland and southern Somalia. The first two are functioning states in northern Somalia, whereas the rest of Somalia is an anarchic region allegedly governed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
The TFG is not actually a government, and the state it purports to govern does not exist. Both are fictions perpetuated by the United Nations and its member states. By doing so, the international community is impeding peace, development and anti-piracy efforts in Somalia.
In the strictly legal sense, the TFG is the internationally recognized government of the Somali state. But by every other measure, the Somali state ceased to exist in 1991, and no government has effectively administered all of Somalia since. The TFG exists only because of financial and military assistance from foreign supporters. It does not have domestic authority or control outside of Mogadishu, and if it tried to assert any claim over Puntland or Somaliland, it would be rebuffed by the established authorities in those states.
Puntland has governed itself as an autonomous region since 1998, but it has not officially broken ties with the rest of Somalia. Somaliland declared independence in 1991 and has since become one of the most robust democracies in Africa. Southern Somalia remains anarchic and stateless.
The TFG has never enjoyed much support among Somalis. Created in 2004 after a peace conference in Mbagathi, Ethiopia, it could not even enter Mogadishu until the Ethiopian invasion of 2006-2007. Backed by the United States, this invasion routed the Shariah-based Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Before the invasion, the home-grown UIC had defeated warlords and was establishing a rudimentary government. It brought the greatest level of order to southern Somalia since 1991.
After destroying the relatively moderate UIC and implanting the unpopular TFG in Mogadishu, Ethiopian troops went home, leaving the task of supporting the TFG to a few thousand African Union soldiers operating under a UN mandate. Known as AMISOM, this primarily Ugandan contingent has been fighting hardline Islamist militants who emerged from the shattered UIC. The main militant group is familiar to many: al-Shabaab.
Although the TFG's mandate was set to expire in August 2011, it was recently extended for another year at a UN-sponsored conference in Kampala, Uganda. This was a mistake. Conferences held outside Somalia that attempt to graft a government onto Somali society have failed for 20 years. Instead of embracing and learning from indigenous Somali successes in the north, the international community undermines them by supporting the TFG.
Somaliland and Puntland were created by Somalis through extensive clan-based consultation, incorporating traditional leaders and culminating in local peace conferences. They have achieved levels of peace and stability unknown in the south.
Puntland initially flirted with democracy, but it has moved toward a more authoritarian model. Puntland's first president was Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Though criticized for his strong-arm tactics, he strengthened the state apparatus and helped build institutions. However, he soon became focused on leveraging his position to become the head of the TFG, and Puntland started to languish.
Yusuf led the TFG from 2004 until 2008. He was succeeded by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who had been a prominent leader in the UIC.
Puntland still has a functioning government, but it has not lived up to its early potential. Piracy has flourished in Puntland because of corruption and lawlessness. Had the international community offered institution-building assistance in the early 2000s instead of trying to artificially reconstitute the Somali state, Puntland probably would not be the pirate haven it is today.
Somaliland is a stable democratic state that respects the rule of law (it even has a pirate prison), but its economic growth has been hampered by its lack of international recognition. Investors, aid agencies and Somaliland's diaspora have been deterred by Somaliland's ambiguous legal status.
Last year, the Obama administration implemented a "dual-track" approach toward Somalia, engaging both the TFG and the governments in Somaliland and Puntland. This is a good first step, but the TFG should be taken out of the equation as soon as possible. The international community should find a way to combat al-Shabaab without supporting the TFG. Military assistance in southern Somalia should be geared toward providing security while locals are encouraged to build their own government from the ground up.
Meanwhile, Puntland should be given incentives to root out corruption and enhance the rule of law. Assistance should be offered to help build its institutions and professionalize its security apparatus. Whether it declares full independence or someday forms a state with southern Somalia is Puntland's decision to make.
Somaliland should be recognized as a sovereign state. It is a model of effective self-governance in a chaotic region, serving as bulwark against terrorism and piracy. The politics of international recognition are complicated, but South Sudan shows that they are not insurmountable.
Recognizing the reality on the ground and adjusting our policies would do much to help the Somali people. Continuing to pretend that Somalia is one state governed by the TFG will bring more of the same.
(*) Timothy A. Ridout   is a master's student at the Fletcher School at Tufts University

Jeremy Scahill Reveals CIA Facility, Prison in Somalia as U.S. Expands Covert Ops in Stricken Nation (DN)
In a new investigative report published by The Nation magazine, independent journalist and Democracy Now! correspondent Jeremy Scahill reveals the CIA is using a secret facility in Somalia for counterterrorism as well as an underground prison in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. Scahill says the CIA is training a new Somali force to conduct operations in the areas controlled by the militant group, Al Shabab, and in Mogadishu. While a U.S. official told The Nation that the CIA does not run the prison, he acknowledged the CIA pays the salaries of Somali agents. [includes rush transcript]
AMY GOODMAN: As famine and drought grip Somalia in what’s being called the worst humanitarian disaster in the world right now, The Nation magazine has revealed the CIA is greatly expanding its covert operations inside Somalia. Following an in-depth, on-the-ground investigation inside Mogadishu, the magazine revealed the agency has set up a secret counterterrorism training base at the international airport in Somalia, where it’s training an indigenous Somali force to conduct targeted combat and capture operations against members of Al Shabab, the militant group with close ties to al-Qaeda.
The Nation has also revealed the CIA is using a secret underground prison in the basement of Somalia’s National Security Agency. While a U.S. official told The Nation that the CIA does not run the prison, he acknowledged the CIA pays the salaries of Somali agents. Some of the prisoners in the prison have been snatched on the streets of Nairobi, Kenya, and rendered to Mogadishu.
The revelations come as the Joint Special Operations Command, known as JSOC, has increased its targeted killing operations inside Somalia. On June 23rd, JSOC forces targeted an alleged Shabab convoy and then landed inside Somalia to collect the bodies.
We’re joined now by Jeremy Scahill, the national security correspondent for The Nation magazine. He has just returned from Mogadishu, Somalia. He’s a longtime Democracy Now! correspondent. His story in this week’s Nation magazine is called "The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia."
Jeremy, talk about what you found in Somalia.
JEREMY SCAHILL: Well, I traveled to Somalia with Rick Rowley from Big Noise Films. He’s a filmmaker. And we were there for about 10 days. And we were investigating the institution of targeted killing that is increasingly present in the U.S. national security strategy, particularly under President Obama. And when we arrived in Mogadishu, within days, we discovered that the CIA had just finished construction of a pretty massive compound at the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu. And the compound, which is not even hidden in plain sight—it’s just in plain sight—looks like a gated community. It has about a dozen buildings inside of it, brand new. It’s a walled compound with guard posts at all of its—at each of its four corners. It’s right on the banks of the Indian Ocean. And then next to it there are six or eight small hangars. And the CIA also has its own aircraft there.
I was able to track down a senior Somali intelligence official and began the process of investigating this facility. And what I discovered is that the CIA is training what was described to me as an indigenous strike force, members of Somalia’s National Security Agency, its intelligence division, to conduct operations in the areas controlled by the Shabab in Mogadishu. And, you know, the situation is very fluid, but the Shabab control a huge portion of Mogadishu. And the internationally recognized government controls about 30 square miles of territory. When I asked a very prominent businessman who works in the port of Mogadishu who controls the rest, he said the Shabab government, and referred to it as such. And everyone says that if the 9,000 troops from Uganda and Burundi that are there as part of the African Union were to pull out, that the Shabab would take over in minutes, if not seconds. And so, we discovered that the CIA was expanding its operations there.
But then I also met a man who claimed that he had been held in an underground prison in the basement of the National Security Agency, which is one of the facilities where the CIA has its personnel, and it’s literally behind the presidential palace in Villa Somalia, which is the semi-fortified area where Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, the U.S.-backed government, is based. And he described to me that he had seen prisoners inside of this and talked to prisoners inside of this basement dungeon who had been there for 18 months or more. There were people that he described as young boys inside the prison, old men, described infestation of bedbugs and mosquitoes, no windows. Prisoners are never allowed to see the light of day, and people are literally going crazy in the basement of this prison. And he said that he had seen both U.S. and French agents, white men, interrogating prisoners, and that some of the prisoners claimed that they had been snatched in neighboring Kenya and brought, rendered, to Somalia. And so, I started that investigation, and more sources came forward when I was in Mogadishu to describe this and confirmed that CIA personnel and possibly U.S. military intelligence personnel are interrogating prisoners held in that basement facility.
We found one man, in particular, the case of one man, in particular, named Ahmed Abdullahi Hassan, who was a 25- or 26-year-old Kenyan of Somali descent, but he’s a Kenyan citizen, who was snatched from his home in July of 2009. And his lawyers allege that he was rendered to Somalia, and they said that it had all the hallmarks of a U.S. rendition. So I investigated that case, and what I learned—and, in fact, what—I can’t say where the U.S. official worked, because they wouldn’t allow us to report it, but let’s just say a U.S. official very familiar with these operations acknowledged the case of Ahmed Abdullahi Hassan, said to me directly, "The U.S. did not render him." And I said, "Well, we’re not alleging that the U.S. rendered him. We’re alleging that the Kenyans rendered him." You have to understand, in 2007 alone, the Kenyans rendered 85 Somalis—or, excuse me, 85 people from Kenya to Somalia on behalf of the U.S. and other governments, including Ethiopia. So there is a long pattern here of the U.S. using proxy forces such as the Kenyans to do these renditions. So, the U.S. doesn’t have to put them on a plane itself. But the U.S. official acknowledged that the U.S. provided the Kenyans with the intelligence that led to Hassan, quote, "being taken off the streets." So, the U.S. is playing semantics with this. It’s clear that they made it abundantly clear they wanted him removed from the game, and he was swiftly abducted, hooded, taken to Wilson Airport, and then rendered to Mogadishu. This man was identified in an intelligence report, that’s believed to be a U.S. intelligence report, that was leaked by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit—he was identified as "the right-hand man" of Ali Nabhan, who was one of the most wanted suspects regarding East Africa that the U.S. was pursuing. He was wanted for questioning over his alleged connection to the 2002 bombings in Kenya that targeted a hotel and an Israeli aircraft that was parked at the airport in Mombasa. Two months after Hassan was snatched off the streets of Kenya, President Obama authorized his first targeted killing in Somalia and killed Ali Nabhan, the man that Hassan was allegedly the right-hand man to. So, the U.S. role in that case seems very, very clear.
As far as the interrogations go inside of this basement prison, the U.S. official that was made available to me for this story said that the U.S. does not directly interrogate prisoners, we jointly "debrief" suspects with Somali agents present—again, it’s all a semantic game—and insisted that it’s only happened a few times in the past year.
AMY GOODMAN: And what is the significance of this?
JEREMY SCAHILL: In January of 2009, President Obama signed a series of executive orders that were intended to end the practices that President Bush and Vice President Cheney had implemented in the war on terror that candidate Obama had denounced on the campaign trail: torture, secret prisons, renditions. And CIA Director Leon Panetta said in April of 2009 that the U.S. was in the process of decommissioning all of its secret prison sites. Two months later, Hassan is rendered to a secret prison in Somalia.
AMY GOODMAN: Is it your sense that, for example, the ICRC, the International Red Cross, knows about this, is going in and visiting the prisoners?
JEREMY SCAHILL: There’s no Red Cross in Mogadishu. There’s no one in Mogadishu. There’s no—there’s no aid agencies. No one will go there. Prison visits? No, there’s not even a, you know, food distribution program that has any Westerners on the ground. They just—all of the white Westerners are hiding inside of AMISOM’s compound, the African Union compoun

1 comment:

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