COUNTER-PIRACY UPDATES

STATUS OF SEIZED VESSELS AND CREWS IN SOMALIA, THE GULF OF ADEN  AND THE INDIAN OCEAN (ecoterra - 03. August 2011)

PROTECTING AND MONITORING LIFE, BIODIVERSITY AND THE ECOSYSTEM IN SOMALIA AND ITS SEAS SINCE 1986 - ECOTERRA Intl.
ECOTERRA Intl. and ECOP-marine serve concerning the counter-piracy issues as advocacy groups in their capacity as human rights, marine and maritime monitors as well as in co-operation with numerous other organizations, groups and individuals as information clearing-house. In difficult cases we have successfully served as mediators.

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STATUS-SUMMARY:

Today, 03. August 2011 at 23h50 UTC, at least 33 larger plus 18 smaller foreign vessels plus one stranded barge are kept in Somali hands against the will of their owners, while at least 572 hostages or captives - including a South-African yachting couple as well as a Danish yacht-family with three children and two friends - suffer to be released.
But even EU NAVFOR, who mostly only counts high-value, often British insured vessels, admitted now that many dozens of vessels were sea-jacked despite their multi-million Euro efforts to protect shipping.
Having come under pressure, EU NAVFOR's operation ATALANTA felt now compelled to publish their updated piracy facts for those vessels, which EU NAVFOR admits had not been protected from pirates and were abducted. EU NAVFOR also admitted in February 2011 for the first time that actually a larger number of vessels and crews is held hostage than those listed on their file.
Since EU NAVFOR's inception at the end of 2008 the piracy off Somalia started in earnest and it has now completely escalated. Only knowledgeable analysts recognized the link.
Please see the situation map of the PIRACY COASTS OF SOMALIA (2011) and the CPU-ARCHIVE
ECOTERRA members can also request the Somali Marine & Coastal Monitor for background info.

- see also HELD HOSTAGE BY PIRATES OFF SOMALIA

and don't forget that SOMALI PIRACY IS CUT-THROAT CAPITALISM

WHAT THE NAVIES OFF SOMALIA NEVER SEE:
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/05/fighting_for_control_of_somali.html

What Foreign Soldiers in Somalia and even their Officers Never Seem to Realize:
The Scramble For Somalia

PEACE KEEPERS OR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS ?
SG Ban Ki-Moon (UN) and President Ram Baran Yadav (Nepal) should resign and take the responsibility for 4,500 Haitians having been killed by a Cholera strain introduced by unchecked, so-called UN Peace-Keepers from Nepal into Haiti.

LATEST:

STILL ALMOST 600 SEAFARERS ARE HELD HOSTAGE IN SOMALIA !
ECOTERRA Intl. has been the first group to clearly and publicly state that the piracy phenomenon off the Somali coasts can only become an issue of the past again, if tangible and sustainable, appropriate and holistic development for the coastal communities kicks in. Solutions to piracy have to tackle the root causes: Abhorrent poverty, environmental degradation, injustice, outside interference. While still billions are spend for the navies, for the general militarization or for mercenaries or conferences, still no real and financially substantial help is coming forward to pacify and develop the coastal areas of Somalia.
Updates on known cases of piracy  - pls see also below this latest news in the status section.

MV HOANG SON SUN :
On 28. July 2011 a report sent by a human rights monitor on a routine proof of life mission, spoke of now only 22 crew members on board of the Mongolian flagged and Vietnamese owned vessel. Though local rumours say that the sailors were killed, it is so far not clearly known if the 2 missing seamen died or are held elsewhere.
However, the situation is worrisome, because apparently no real efforts are made to free the all-Vietnamese crew.

EXCLUSIVE:
FOUR THAI SAILORS PLEAD FOR HELP
NOT ALL CREW FREED BY SOMALI PIRATES FROM THAI VESSEL  (ecop-marine)
Burmese seafarers released, but Thai officers still held
A Somali group holding the last vessel of a fleet of three captured fishing vessels from Thailand, FV PRANTALAY 12, released 14 Burmese seamen of the originally 25 Thai and Burmese hostages into the hands of local elders, who handed them to the authorities of Puntland, the federal regional regional state of Somalia.
The vessel was without fuel and had lost its anchorage in the heavy swell and high waves at Dhanane (a little known location 8nm South of Eyl where also MV IRENE was held - not Ceel Dhanaane where the fishing vessel was held a longer time ago) and drifted helpless with the guards and hostages for a longer time to the shore near Dinowda, where it is beached now.
While 7 of the crew-members had died already in the horrible ordeal, as we reported earlier, 18 were held by the gang before the 14 Burmese were released and now the four surviving crew members from Thailand are held on land near Dinowda. They are the captain, the chief engineer, 2nd chief engineer and the chief officer - all of Thai nationality.
A human rights monitor could get proof of life for the remaining four sailors over a crackling mobile phone line in a re-routed conference call.
The Chief Officer, who gave his name as Tom Miasin, said in broken English that they are four Thai nationals and he did plead for help to the ship-owner and anyone who can help, because still the gang demands for a ransom to release them.
Marine observers believe the group holding the vessel, seen already earlier as unseaworthy by NATO officials, will still try to get the ship afloat. But since they do not have an auxiliary vessel to pull the ship off the beach, the fishing vessel appears to be now lost for the shipowner, which is why we take it off our monitoring list. Analysts say it is in this case not believed that the stranding of the vessel was organized to cash in on an insurance.
However, the biggest problem is now to free the remaining four crew-members and to secure their safe repatriation, since it appears that they can no longer be freed together with their vessel.
BACKGROUND: (ecop-marine)
THAI FISHING FLEET : Seized April 18, 2010 with a total crew of 77 sailors, of which 12 are Thai and the others of different nationalities, the Thailand-flagged vessels operating out of Djibouti were fishing illegal in the Indian Ocean off Minicoy Island in the fishing grounds of the Maldives. All three vessels were then commandeered towards the Somali coast by a group of in total around 15 Somalis. Already there are reports of three dead sailors with these vessels.
FV PRANTALAY 11 with a crew of 26 (freed and towed by Indian Navy and Coastguard, returned to Thailand )
FV PRANTALAY 12 with an original crew of 26 (taken over by a second pirate group and held together with crew off Eyl; said to be no longer seaworthy, but was apparently still distributing fuel to pirated vessels)
FV PRANTALAY 14 with a crew of 25 (shot up, set ablaze and sunk by Indian Navy and Coastguard)
None of these vessels is registered and authorized by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission to  fish in the Indian Ocean.
The fleet was mostly held off the coast at Kulub near Garacad (06 59N 049 24E) at the north-eastern Indian Ocean coast of Somalia. The captors already threatened since months to use one of the hunter-vessels of the group as a piracy-launch, while negotiations have not been forthcoming. Prantalay 14 left the coast in the morning of 20. September to what is said to be another piracy expedition. Three skiffs, three ladders and other equipment were observed to be on board.  The vessel has been  further observed on 28. September near the shipping lanes in the area. On 30. September  at 10h15 UTC a Pirate Action Group consisting of one skiffs with ladders and weapons was reported in position 07 34 N 057 39 E, which is assessed to be connected to an operation of this fishing vessel as Mother Ship - reported in position 06 47 N 060 51 E. A regional minister from Puntland got into problems when final negotiations for the release of the held vessels were supposed to take place at Garacad, but went sour. Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva wants the navy to extend its anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia for another month. He will seek cabinet approval for an additional budget of about 100 million baht for this purpose, navy chief Admiral Kamthorn Phumhiran said earlier. Adm Kamthorn said Mr Abhisit wants the mission of The Royal Thai Navy Counter Piracy Task Unit of two navy ships with 351 sailors and 20 special warfare troops on board, which had left Thailand on Sept 10 and is now operating in the Gulf of Aden, extended. The mission was originally set for 98 days, ending on Dec 12., but the usual fishing season goes beyond that time, which is believed to be behind the extension demands. Now also FV PRANTALAY 11 left on another hunting mission for piracy prey, because the Thais have not at all even tried to wrench the ships from the fists of their captors. Only PRANTALAY 12 and her crew was then left as a super-hostage at the coast until on 16th November also FV PRANTALAY 12 sailed again to the oceans. All vessels were were and are abused for piracy missions since the shipowner PT Interfisheries didn't secure their release.
FV PRANTALAY 11 and FV PRANTALAY 12 returned in the meantime after having been used to capture another merchant vessels, and were first held again off Kulub (near Garacad) at the North-Eastern Somali Indian Ocean coast. FV PRANTALAY 11 was said to be still out hunting but then came to Ceel Gaan near Harardheere, while P RANTALAY 12 is moored north of Hobyo and PRANTALAY 14 was shot out of the water by the INDIAN NAVY.
The Indian Navy and Coast Guard sunk FV PRANTALAY 14 in a military action, which was termed an anti-piracy operation and was executed near the Lakshadweep group of islands in the utmost southeastern portion of the Arabian Sea of the Indian Ocean. The Islands belong to India.
The Somali buccaneers had been using FV Prantalay 14 and the two other pirated vessels of that fishing fleet from Thailand as piracy launches after their owner refused a deal to have the vessels released against a ransom.
Indian warship INS CANKARSO, a fast attack craft, intercepted FV PRANTAY 14 during evening hours of 21. January 2011 around 370 km off the Kochi coast.
According to a statement from the Indian navy their frigate fired the first shot as a warning shot well ahead of the bows of Prantalay in order to force the pirated fishing vessel to stop. Then the pirates opened fire with automatic weapons in a desperate bid to escape. The Indian naval vessel then opened up and in what the Indian navy reportedly called 'limited fire in self defense'  they used heavy guns, probably including ship-to-ship missiles or a torpedo, which caused the Thailand ship to burst into flames and to sink. The vessel wouldn't have sunk so fast if only the excess fuel for the outboard engines of the skiffs had exploded.
The Indian navy stated that they rescued 20 fishermen and arrested 15 Somali pirates.
But the crew of FV PRANTALAY 14 comprised 26 seafarers of Thai and Myanmar nationalities..
Despite official requests the Indian authorities have so far not answered the question was happened to the missing 6 crew-members and if any of the surviving crew-members is injured.
Likewise it has not been communicated how many Somalis lost their live in the attack and how many of the 15 arrested are injured, because in a communicated picture only 12 arrested Somalis were shown.
In a similar attack against commandeered Thai fishing vessel FV EKAWAT NAVA 5 the Indian Navy had killed all crew, except for one survivor, who was found by a merchant ship six days after the attack floating in the Gulf of Aden. He survived and could tell the real story. The government of Thailand back then had officially protested to the Indian Government.
FV PRANTALAY 11 was then reported as being held at the Central Somali coast off Ceel Gaan (Harardheere district), but must have left for another piracy mission, since it was freed on 05. February 2011 by the Indian Navy near the Lakshadweep islands. 52 men, of which 28 are said to be pirates and 24 men of the original 26 member crew, were arrested in the swoop after some exchange of gunfire. No information has transpired yet concerning the 2 missing crew members.
According to informed sources, the Thai fishing vessel FV PRANTALAY 14 had 25 Somali pirates on board of which 15 were captured alive. 10 Somalis were killed during the exchange of fire and 14 Somalis were arrested, while one wounded man is treated for his injuries at a medical facility.
Allegedly the heavy 40mm and 20mm gunfire from INS CANKARSO, a fast Indian attack craft which had intercepted FV PRANTALAY 14 during the evening hours of 21. January 2011 around 370 km off the Kochi coast, was sufficient to sink the vessel. Other reports, however, stated that the sinking vessel was engulfed in flames.
The fishermen stated that 22 of the original crew of 26 sailors were on this piracy trip and 20 survived the naval operation. The nationalities of the two seamen who died in the attack were not released yet.
After the operation by the Indian navy and coastguard to free FV PRANTALAY 11 - with 52 people surviving - 28 were identified as pirates and 24 crew. The vessel then was taken in tow by the Indian Navy and secured.
Further details on how many people were killed during the operation have not yet been made available, but human rights observers wondered why the arrested men were shown blindfolded and were being led into the cells with black sacks over their heads. India has announced it would probe links, which the Somali pirates might have with terrorist groups.
At least five crew members of the three Thai trawlers hijacked by pirates have been reported to have died of hunger and sickness after the owner of the trawlers refused to pay ransom during the 10-month-long hostage crisis.
Strapped of resources, the pirates provided little food during this time to the hostages. “Four crew members on FV PRANTALAY 14 fell sick and died due to lack of medical supplies and one crew member from PRANTALAY 11, the vessel rescued by the Navy and Coast Guard on Sunday, is also reported to have died of the same reason,” an Indian officer from Yellow Gate police station, where the culprits are held, stated.
Thai officials, who had regularly been alerted about the plight of the seafarers have so far not managed to achieve any peaceful solution. >From the original crews of Prantalay 11 and 14 only 44 seafarers survived the ordeal.
FV PRANTALAY 12, more like a factory ship and not as fast as others in her fleet, as well as maybe some other survivors of the crews from the two other vessels were still kept under pirate control in Somalia. Though pirates, like in the case of the attack by the South Korean Navy on pirated MV SAMHO JEWELRY, made announcements that they would retaliate for each of the killed or arrested Somali, such acts had not been recorded yet.
Unfortunately it is reported that there are also no real negotiations to free FV PRANTALAY 12, the last of the Thai fishing fleet, which was reportedly fishing illegally in the Indian Ocean. One member of the original crew was missing or dead already some time back and three crew had died during the last months. The vessel and the remaining around 20 crew were mostly held at the North-Eastern Somali Indian Ocean coast off Ceel Dhanaane. No solution was in sight for most of the time.
The FV PRANTALAY 12 was due to her involvement in piracy now also wanted and it was observed that the PRANTALAY-12 had on board a tripod mounted with a 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun
NATO, who had in May 2011 stated that the release of the FV Prantalay 12, the last of a group of three fish-poaching vessels of a Thai fleet, "would currently take place", while we reported that it was still at the same location with its crew as hostages, reiterated then and rephrased:

FV PRANTALY 12, although still in pirate possession, is no longer in a seaworthy state and, according to a pirate statement, will be returned without ransom payment in due course.

However, it is interesting to note that NATO seems to have had direct contacts with the Somali pirates - something which ship-captains and analysts claimed since long, since they had observed specific pirate attacks under the watch of naval vessels with no response from the official watch-keepers.
Other observers reported from Galkayo that the Somali broker, who earlier had disappeared with the ransom money for the release of the Prantalay fleet, was back in town and he was pressurized by local elders to at least release the crew.
FV Prantalay 12 then had left for a a new piracy mission, but came back without having achieved anything and was now used as supply vessel for the other hostage ships. Mid May 2011 the pirate group holding the vessel was attacked by another armed Somali group and the vessel was then forcibly taken over. The second group allegedly first had the consent of the owner and were geared up by the Somali broker, who had received the ransom money earlier but then disappeared for months, to "liberate" the vessel. Several crew members of this vessel reportedly already had died of mal-nutrition and disease during the many month of the hostage crisis. Then a release was expected by NATO, though local onservers maintained that the second group is also a pirate group and they are expecting now their share from the earlier paid ransom, which caused the delay in the release, confusing even NATO, who had communications with the pirates.
The vessel, which reportedly is no longer seaworthy and her crew were then held hostage off Eyl at the North-Eastern Indian Ocean coast of Somalia.
That seven of the original crew of this vessel are dead already was reported and for six confirmed.
On 12. July 2011 FV PRANTALAY was still reported to be moored 7nm off Eyl, but thereafter the vessel cut its anchor and drifted to Dinowda. On 01. of August the hostage takers handed 14 Burmese seafarers to local elders and to the Puntland authorities, but continue to hold four officers of Thai nationality.
The remaining hostages are now held hostage for ransom on land near Dinowda.


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Somali Piracy Overview (NATO)
The areas of concern remain the Southern Red Sea, Bab Al Mandeb and Gulf of Aden. There have been numerous reports over the last month of ‘swarms’ of skiffs attacking merchant traffic. We remain sceptical as to whether this was pirate activity. Despite the numerous reports, piracy activity in this area remains constant but at low intensity. In July we have had three confirmed attacks out of 22 reports and with no merchant ships being pirated. The weather is still making both the Arabian Sea and the Somali Basin a challenge to operate in and currently there is no known pirate activity at sea in those areas.
Overview and Weekly Piracy Assessment (22-28 July 11)
During the reporting period (22 - 28 Jul 11) there were: one disruption, three attacks, one approach and three suspicious incidents. Two attacks and three suspicious incidents were reported in the Southern Red Sea (SRS)/Bab Al Mandeb (BAM) region. One disruption, one attack and one approach were committed within the Gulf of Aden (GOA). No acts of piracy were committed within the Arabian Sea (AS). We assess, that with the South West Monsoon at full swing, the pirates will continue focus their effort within the Southern Red Sea (SRS)/Bab Al Mandeb (BAM)/Gulf of Aden (GOA) in a similar pattern to last year, it is currently assessed that a unknown Pirate Attack Group (PAG) is active within the SRS/BAM. The pirates will continue trying to blend into local fishing activity/traffic and seek targets of opportunity to strike; accordingly this area remains a high threat region. Despite the weather, it cannot be excluded that pirates will attempt hijackings in the Arabian Sea using local dhows as their primary mother ship. Extra vigilance and early adoption of BMP practices throughout for all areas remains essential and is firmly recommended. To assist counter piracy efforts ships masters are highly encouraged to provide detailed and descriptive reports of suspicious vessel activity. The additional provision of respective images, whenever possible, would be a most valuable contribution to the overall anti piracy endeavour.
Gulf of Aden/Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).
It is assessed that the IRTC continues to be a high threat area; one PAG was disrupted within the GOA this week along with two other incidents. Within the GOA, the assessment that sporadic acts of piracy can occur at any time in this area remains unchanged. The previously pirated JUBBA XX has been confirmed released by her owners and is no longer assessed as a threat to shipping. She will continue her voyage to Berbera.
Arabian Sea/Greater Somali Basin.
Even though the South West monsoon is now established it appears that pirates are still willing to accept higher risks and to push the capacities of the platforms used for pirate operation to their limits.

TWO CASE STUDIES BY THE UN MONITORING GROUP:

Pirate Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (UN MONITORING GROUP)
Annex 4.1.a.: Pirate attack on the MV Almezaan
1. On 23 March 2010 at 0800 UTC1, the Panama-flagged and UAE-based general cargo vessel MV Almezaan (IMO 7906710)2 came under pirate attack while en route to Mogadishu, reportedly at position 0348N.04808E, an estimated 33NM off the coast of Somalia. The vessel issued a distress call.
2. Eight minutes later, at 0808UTC, UKMTO3 confirmed the attack and monitored a radio call from the vessel saying that the ‘security team has returned fire’ and that the pirates are approaching the vessel for a second attack.4.
3. Half an hour later, the MV Almezaan reported its current position to be 0345N.04807E, roughly 3NM away from its previous position. It also stated that the vessel had been attacked by 3 skiffs carrying pirates armed with AK47’s and that the MV Almezaan’s ‘on board security’ had fired parachute flares. No casualties were reported.5
4. Spanish EUNAVFOR frigate ESPS NAVARRA, patrolling not far from the incident, immediately responded to the distress call from the vessel. At 0916 UTC the helicopter of the ESPS Navarra detected a pirate whaler and two skiffs heading towards the Somali coast at position 0354N.04758E, being 11.75NM (course 301°) from the initial reported position of the MV Almezaan. The helicopter forced the pirates to stop by firing warning shots, using a 12.7mm heavy machine gun. At 1003 UTC the Spanish Navy vessel deployed a boarding team onto the skiffs and the whaler. At about the same time, two other skiffs were detected in the vicinity and stopped as well.
5. Upon boarding the two skiffs, the Spanish team found a dead body on one of them, with a gunshot wound to the thorax. The boarding team also observed numerous, small calibre bullet holes in the skiff. The bottom of the skiff was found to be full of water, mixed with blood, and contained a large quantity of ammunition and cartridges. Among the weapons were 3 RPG grenades and
3 launchers.
6. At 1300 UTC6 the boarding team then boarded the two other skiffs, which had been stopped nearby. As both skiffs contained lots of fishing equipment and none of the usual evidence of piracy activity, they were determined to be genuine fishing boats and fishermen and not part of the PAG.
Both fishing skiffs were released and continued on their way.
7. At the same time (1300 UTC), the medical officer from the ESPS Navarra boarded the skiff with the dead body, confirmed the victim’s death and reported that the body had two bullet wounds to the thorax of a small calibre, probably either 5.56mm or 7.62mm. The state of rigor mortis indicated the moment of death to have been 4-5 hours prior to the EU boarding — approximately the same time as the reported attack on the MV Almezaan.
8. At 1900 UTC the bullet-pierced skiff was cast adrift and the 6 pirates and the corpse were taken on board the ESPS Navarra, together with their remaining skiff.
9. The six pirates identified their deceased associate and stated that two other members of their group had been killed and fallen overboard during the shoot-out with the ship they had attacked. All pirates identified the ship as a general cargo vessel and, when in sight of the MV Almezaan, confirmed that it corresponded to the ship they had attacked, but were not able to identify the vessel by name.
10. A day later, on 24 March 2010 at 0800UTC the Captain of the MV Almezaan accepted a request for boarding, permitting an ESPS Navarra team to board his vessel, accompanied by the EUNAVFOR FHQ Legal Advisor.
11. According to the MV Almezaan’s Captain, his vessel was bound for Mogadishu when it was attacked at position 0354N, 04806E7 by a PAG that had opened fire with AK47 assault rifles. He stated that although the vessel lacked the speed to escape, the crew had managed to repel the PAG by firing parachute rocket flares at them. Asked about the presence of arms or an armed escort on board of the MV Almezaan, the Captain said that he ‘assumed’ he didn’t have any security on board and that the ship wasn’t carrying any type of weapons. When shown pictures of the skiffs and the whaler, he said that they were different from the ones involved in the incident and that the pirates apprehended by EUNAVFOR therefore couldn’t have been those who had attacked his ship. Consequently, the Captain did not wish to file a formal complaint against the individuals apprehended by the ESPS
Navarra.8
12. The ESPS Navarra boarding team had no authority to conduct a more thorough search of the MV Almezaan and returned to their vessel, leaving the MV Almezaan to continue its journey to Mogadishu.
13. Since the Captain and crew of the MV Almezaan had not identified the pirates or filed a complaint, they could not be held legally responsible for the assault against the MV Almezaan.
Moreover, the pirates’ confession and the presence of heavy weaponry in their skiff was considered insufficient evidence to merit sending them to stand trial in Kenya. They were released and returned to the Somali coast. The body of the deceased pirate was handed over to AMISOM in Mogadishu.
Analysis
14. The MV Almezaan is a 30-year-old ‘low and slow’9 UAE-based general cargo vessel, which routinely sails between the UAE, Yemen and Somalia. The vessel has not adopted any of the ‘best practices’ prescribed by the shipping industry for counter-piracy, and has never registered or reported its journeys with MSCHOA10 or UKMTO. In the past, it has twice been hijacked by Somali pirates.11
15. The location and position of the reported attack is consistent with the location of the PAG apprehended by the ESPS Navarra, given the timing between the initial distress call and the arrival of the helicopter at the scene. The details of the MV Almezaan’s distress call are also consistent with description of the PAG and its weapons. No other PAG’s were detected in the vicinity of the incident and the pirates identified the MV Almezaan as the vessel they had attacked.
Conclusions
16. The nature of the injuries to the deceased pirate, and the bullet holes in the skiff, indicate that a firefight took place. The time of death of the victim, as determined by the medical officer of ESPS Navarra, is consistent with the timing of the reported attack. In view of the MV Almezaan’s initial report to UKMTO, that the vessel had come under attack by a PAG and that its security team had
returned fire, the Monitoring Group believes that a firefight took place between the PAG and the MV Almezaan. The MV Almezaan Captain’s claim that his crew deterred a team of heavily armed pirates only by using parachute flares is not credible.
17. The Monitoring Group therefore believes that the vessel MV Almezaan was indeed carrying weapons on board with the purpose of protecting and defending themselves against Somali pirates. The incident took place inside the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone and the MV Almezaan then continued its journey to Mogadishu, presumably with weapons on board, in violation of the general
and complete arms embargo on Somalia.
18. The operator of the vessel, Biyat International Group of Companies LLC12 and its managing director Mr. Mohammed Iqbal, has not replied to a letter from the Monitoring Group seeking clarification.